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I. INTRODUCTION
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third case has caused a puzzle. Twombly 2 and Iqbal appear to virtually
all observers as rejecting the Conley standard that the "short and plain
statement" required of a complainant is satisfied "unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim that would entitle him to relief,"5 and instead requiring enough
factual specificity to make the plaintiffs allegations plausible.6 The
Court itself seems to agree with the observation that it was rejecting the
Conley standard.7 The puzzle comes from Erickson v. Pardus, in which
the Court approved the adequacy of a bare bones pleading with virtually
1. See, e.g., Adam M. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293
(2010) ("Federal pleading standards are in crisis."). See also Robert G. Bone, Twombly,
Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009)
[hereinafter Bone, Pleading Rules]; Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and
Revised: a Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010)
[hereinafter Bone, Plausibility Pleading]; Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up The Chaff With
Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial
Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U.L. REv. 1217 (2008); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and
the Dilemmas of "General Rules," 2009 Wis. L. REV. 535 (2009). See generally, Penn
Statim, Reflections on Iqbal: Discerning Its Rule, Grappling with its Implications,
http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/iqbal-portal/ (2010) (summarizing various legislative
responses and scholarly criticism).
2. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint generally alleging
parallel business conduct and conspiracy did not state a plausible claim on which relief
could be granted under the Sherman Act).
3. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (finding that civil rights complaint
should be dismissed as its specific allegations did not "nudge" claims of discrimination
across the line from conceivable to plausible).
4. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
5. Id. at 45-46.
6. See Martin H. Redish & Lee Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and the Future of
Pleading in the Federal Courts: A Normative and Empirical Analysis 25 (Research
Symposium on Empirical Studies Of Civil Liability at Northwestern University School of
Law, Oct. 10, 2008, available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract-1581481) (noting that as
of October 2008, 480 rulings had cited Twombly as a revision of the Conley standard,
although its uses and the conclusions of courts varied enormously). See also Bone,
Pleading Rules, supra note 1, at 903 (suggesting that without adequate protections for
defendants, discovery costs may constitute a violation of due process rights); Richard
Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & Pot'Y 61 (2007); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C.L. REV. 431, 432 (2008) (suggesting that one of the most
pressing issue confronting scholars in the wake of Twombly is the question of what,
exactly, is plausibility pleading?); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic
v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 121, 124 (2007), available at
https://www.virginalawreview.org//inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf.)
7. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63 ("We could go on, but there is no need to pile
up further citations to show that Conley's 'no set of facts' language has been questioned,
criticized, and explained away long enough.... The phrase is best forgotten as an
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard. . . ."). See also id. at 577
(Stevens, J. dissenting) ("Today... the Court scraps Conley's "no set of facts"
language ... [and] dismisses it as careless composition.").
8. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
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no factual specificity that was much closer to the Conley than to the
Twombly standard.9
We think there is an answer to this puzzle, although whether it
calms the storm or intensifies it remains to be seen. The answer is that
Conley is not so much wrong as instead a special case of the general
domain of pleading requirements, to-wit a case in which knowledge of
the relevant facts is reasonably symmetrically distributed over the parties
and discovery costs are likely to be both relatively low and
symmetrical.' 0 These conditions may very well have been a reasonable
description of federal litigation at the time the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) were adopted, and thus at the time Conley was
decided this standard may have been reasonably general." However,
modem litigation may present other classes of litigation, ones in which
each of these three variables takes on different values: knowledge of the
events can be asymmetrical, and discovery costs can be both quite high
and also asymmetrical. 12 In such cases, applying the Conley gloss when
its assumptions are false may be socially perverse. 3 Thus, the solution
to the puzzle is that Twombly and Iqbal are responses to the changed
conditions of litigation in certain cases, while Erickson applied more or
less the Conley standard where the prior conditions pertained.14
9. See id. at 93. The decision, puzzlingly, stated that "[The] Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." . . . [W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a
judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Id.
(internal citations omitted). Twombly was cited for both propositions. Id.
10. In Erickson, both parties had observational data of treatment, for example. To be
clear, costs and information are not necessarily independent variables. In Conley, for
example, most likely the plaintiffs could easily and cheaply obtain certain initial facts but
the cost and difficulty of obtaining information increased as it approached the center of
the conspiracy.
11. See, e.g., infra Section II.A.
12. See, e.g., supra note I and articles cited. See also Suzanne Sherry, Foundational
Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011). Prof. Sherry's
approach is similar to our own, in many ways, although she grounds her analysis in what
appears to be a substantive concept of "doctrine," rather than in an examination of "rules"
which guide decision making.
13. As we will discuss below, our conception of socially optimum outcomes takes
into consideration not only the cost of errors in favor of plaintiffs, but also the cost of
errors in favor of defendants.
14. Prof. Bone sees this about Twombly but not Erickson, seeing the later case as one
where the essential elements of liability flow naturally from the general allegations of a
claim. Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note I at 886 and accompanying foomotes. It is
obvious that informational and cost dissymmetry can cut in opposite directions.
Conversely, both could favor lowering rather than raising pleading standards. Indeed,
there could be any relationship at all between them, which is why, as we explain in the
remainder of this article, replacing the Conley gloss with another static rule would not
likely optimize the interests of the legal system.
2010] 3
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Why this explanation, if true, may intensify rather than quiet the
storm is because it suggests that the Court's approach to pleading does
not respect the important goal of procedure to be trans-substantive, and
that now different substantive areas will have different procedural
requirements with Rule 8,15 meaning one thing in one context, and
something else in another.
However, we think there is an answer to this, too: the application of
Rule 8 already had different results in different contexts as a function of
information and cost asymmetries. Nonetheless, the objection deserves
careful consideration because it has quite significant jurisprudential
implications. It implicitly adopts a conception of a rule as a static entity
applicable in an invariant way across its domain. This is the
conventional view of what it means to be a rule, and indeed of what the
rule of law entails.' 6 Its conventionality, however, does not mean it is
invariably the correct or optimal conception of a rule. As we elaborate
below, rules and their domains may be dynamic. The concern about
trans-substantive procedural rules may require something like the
Iqbal/Twombly gloss. The Conley gloss on Rule 8 may have been
intended as a universal statement of the Rule's meaning, or it may
instead have been the best approximation of the optimal solution of the
legal system's interests at the time and under those conditions. But
conditions change, and what is optimal under one set of conditions may
not be optimal under another. Reaching consistent results in dynamic
domains may require a dynamic rule.
There is a third interesting aspect to this line of cases. If Rule 8
does adopt a dynamic conception of rules, an inevitable consequence will
be that the distinction between procedure and evidence will be breeched.
The most obvious implication of this point is that it will not be possible
to articulate a formal standard for pleading that can be applied pre-
discovery without taking into account substantive evidence. More
precisely, these cases make evident what has, in our opinion, always
been true, that the wall between evidence and procedure is always
breached, and the real question is how much, not whether, the evidence
needs to be considered prior to discovery. This explains, in part, the
remarkable awkwardness in the Court's attempts to articulate its
substitute for the Conley standard. It attempted to deny precisely what it
was doing in breaching the procedure/evidence boundary, and perhaps it
15. For simplicity, we assume that the cases are interpreting Rule 8, but in fact there
is a relationship between Rule 8 and Rule 12 at stake as well.
16. See generally, Antonin Scalia, Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1175 (1989).
4 [Vol. 115:1
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also attempted to preserve the appearance of a static rule.17  Breeching
the procedure/evidence divide has a second implication. Contrary to the
virtually unanimous critical commentary,' 8 the cases will not result in
trial judges idiosyncratically deciding on the adequacy of pleadings in
light solely of their common sense and experience. This fear neglects the
central organizing feature of the evidentiary regime, which is its
comparative nature. The parties, through their various efforts, will
present courts with structured, not open ended choices.
The fourth interesting point is that, ironically but not surprisingly,
the reactions of the commentators have also been consistent in their
proposals for responding to these cases.19 In a short period of time, these
cases have generated a robust and insightful literature, but each of the
commentators responds with another static rule that has some of the
same predictable consequences as the original reading of Rule 8.20 The
proposals each try to shoehorn the litigation dynamic into a modified set
of necessary and sufficient conditions from which conclusions may be
deduced, and in doing so generate a different but equally erratic set of
outcomes as those caused by the original Conley gloss. This is good
evidence that the distinction between a static and dynamic rule is of some
importance.21
17. Even in Iqbal, the Court seemed to be denying what it was doing when it
asserted that, in the end, determinations of plausibility will be informed by "the good
discretion of the court" rather than by considerations of evidence. As we discuss below,
those two are synonymous. See infra Section IV. For an insightful analysis of the
relationship between procedure and evidence, see Michael Pardo, Pleadings, Proof and
Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation, Bos. COL. L. REV., (forthcoming),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1585331).
18. The core of this criticism was first articulated in Justice Stevens' dissent in Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 571 (2007) and expanded upon in Justice Souter's
dissent in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009). For further exploration of
these critiques, see infra Section VI.
19. See, infra Section VI.
20. See, e.g., Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 1, at 878. For further exploration,
see infra Section VI.
21. We do not discuss the process questions of whether rules should be modified
through legislative, rule making, or judicial interpretative processes, not because they are
not interesting and important, but simply because what engages us here are the
jurisprudential questions. For a discussion of the merits of the changes, see Whether the
Supreme Court has Limited Americans' Access to Court: Hearing Before the Sen.
Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 111-530 at 7 (2009) (Prepared Statement of
Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice University
of Pennsylvania). We do not accept that it is obvious that what the Court has done in
Iqbal/Twombly is to change the rule. The central point of this paper is that what it means
to be a rule is itself an important question that is prior to the question whether a rule has
been changed.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
We discuss these points in turn and then conclude with some
suggestions concerning how to respond to the shift from a static to a
dynamic conception of Rule 8.22
II. CONLEY, TWOMBLY, AND IQBAL AND THE COSTS OF LITIGATION
The history of pleading practice has been characterized by periods
of increasingly demanding pleading standards, followed by dramatic
liberalizations, which are then followed by periods of increasing
complexity.2 3 Because pleading standards control access to the courts,24
the degree of rigor with which pleadings are scrutinized has a direct
effect on the number of potentially meritorious claims that are rejected
and the number of frivolous claims that are allowed to proceed. Strict
pleading standards may result in an increase in the number of errors
against the plaintiff, while lax pleading standards may result in an
increase in the number of errors against the defendant.2 5 These types of
22. It is important to note that much of what generates the difficulty here, as
elsewhere in the litigation process, is the failure of parties to bear the true cost of their
behavior, and one solution to many procedural problems would be a true cost bearing
regime, which is different from a cost shifting regime. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay and
Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of Litigation, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, 442-51 (Peter Newman ed., vol. 3, Macmillan) (1998); James
W. Hughes and Edward A. Snyder, Allocation ofLitigation Costs: American and English
Rules, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAw, 51-56 (Peter
Newman ed., vol. 1 Macmillan) (1998). If plaintiffs could not externalize costs, for
example, defendants would not be coerced into settlements. If defendants could not
externalize costs, plaintiffs would not be inhibited from suing, and so on. In fact, cost
bearing should occur from beginning to end, including the parties bearing the true cost of
their trial activity; when one party puts in evidence, it imposes costs on the other through
lawyer's time and the need to respond and so on. However, one of the authors, Prof.
Allen, once engaged in the effort to articulate such a scheme and gave it up as hopelessly
complex. Who is exactly causing what cost turns out to be extremely complicated and
perhaps impossible to model. Of course, even if a scheme could be articulated,
adjustments to it would be appropriate for policy reasons.
23. See Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 46
(1957) ("I fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading cannot be made
to do the service of trial and that live issues between active litigants are not to be
disposed of or evaded on the paper pleadings"). See also, Richard L. Marcus, The
Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1749, 1750 (1998)
[hereinafter Marcus, Puzzling Persistence] (discussing the periodic revitalization of fact
pleading); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433 (1986) [hereinafter Marcus, Revival] (analyzing the
evolution of common law pleading, the Field Code, and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
24. See e.g., Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note I at 876 (discussing Twombly in the
context of institutional framework which controls access to legal sanctioned transfers of
wealth).
25. This presumes that a failure to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim is an
error when the plaintiff should, because of the facts, fail to prevail on the merits and vice
versa.
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errors are commonly called Type I and Type II errors.2 6 A Type I error
occurs when a test returns a false positive,27 and it is this type of error
with which the Court was clearly concerned in Twombly. 28 A Type II
error occurs where a test returns a false negative, 2 9 and it is this type of
error with which Professor and later Judge Charles Clark, was
concerned. 3 0  The distributions and costs of the errors and correct
decisions presumably have an effect on primary behavior. The risk of
liability is a cost of doing business, and changing that risk will affect the
incentives that people have in shaping their primary conduct.3 1
In order to understand the problems facing contemporary courts, it
is helpful to contextualize them in the developments in procedure and
pleading that have occurred over the last three decades.32 We thus first
examine how the original FRCP allocated errors and the cost of errors
between plaintiffs and defendants, how this balance changed over the last
century, and how the Court and Congress responded.
A. A Brief History of Pleading33
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure begin with a broad declaration
of their scope: "There is one form of action-the civil action." 34 By
26. See generally, JACKSON, ET. AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 473
(2003) (for a concise introduction into statistical analysis and concepts).
27. Id. at 511.
28. See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (discussing the process
of "hedg[ing] against false inferences").
29. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 511.
30. See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 774 (2d Cir. 1944) ("[W]e do not
see how the plaintiff may be deprived of his day in court to show what he obviously so
firmly believes and what for present purposes defendant must be taken as admitting.").
31. Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics Of
Pleading And Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 39 (2009). Prof.
Hylton's economic theory focuses on the relationship between dismissal on the pleadings
and summary judgment, but his analysis generalizes to what we examine in the text.
Both arguments are straight forward micro-economic arguments about the costs of errors
and incentives to obey the law. Prof. Hylton does not deal with the jurisprudential issues
critical to the Court's cases, such what it means to be a rule or the relationship between
procedure and evidence. For a similar economic analysis, see Paul Stancil, Balancing the
Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REv. 90 (2009).
32. See, e.g., Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting) [hereinafter FRCP Amendments] ("When the Federal Rules first
appeared in 1938, the discovery provisions properly were viewed as a constructive
improvement. But experience under the discovery Rules demonstrates that not
infrequently [they have been] exploited to the disadvantage of justice. . .. Delay and
expense now characterize a large percentage of all civil litigation.") (internal quotations
omitted).
33. This is a very brief history, and as in any such account objectionable on many
grounds. For a detailed treatment, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of
1934, 130 U.PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
2010] 7
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reducing the forms of pleading to one, the rules took a substantial step
toward what Clark regarded as the "basic" objective of procedural
reform: simplifying the pleading process." By streamlining the
"procedural formalities" of pleading, the new rules were designed to give
greater "significance and effectiveness" to discovery, pre-trial
conferences, and motions for summary judgment.36 In Clark's opinion
the game of polishing pleadings was rarely worth the candle, since the
dismissal of one complaint due to a dearth of facts would simply result in
another round of pleading.37 A far better use for pleadings was to
differentiate the claims brought from all others, so as to allow the proper
application of res judicata and ensure that the claim was heard in the
proper forum under the proper mode of adjudication. Discovery and
summary judgment would allow for the rapid "disclosure of all facts and
matters in dispute, followed by prompt and final adjudication wherever
that is feasible." 3 9  The one area where specific pleadings would be
required would be in claims related to fraud and mistake where mere
35. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 456 (1941). Clark did not
achieve everything he wanted through the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; other scholars have gone so far as to suggest that Clark sought to have
scrutiny of pleadings eliminated entirely. See also Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E.
Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L. J. 914, 927 (1976)
(discussing Clark's views on pleadings in his academic writings and judicial opinions).
36. Clark, supra note 35, at 456. In addition to a hearing on a motion to dismiss
provided by Rule 12(b)(6), the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provide for a
motion for a more definite statement (which experience suggest is much less frequently
used). See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The Rules also allowed for a pre-trial conference before
the court where the parties may be required to establish a framework for expediting the
disposition of the action, establishing control of the case by the court (or a magistrate
judge), discouraging wasteful pre-trial activities, and facilitating settlement. See FED R.
Civ. P. 16. Further, parties are required to disclose certain relevant information and
documents in their knowledge or possession at the outset of the litigation and before any
discovery request is made and discovery requests may be limited in their scope and
number by the court. See FED. R. Clv. P. 26. Other methods of discovery are typically
limited by the court's discretion or explicitly by rule. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 33
(limiting the number of written interrogatories to 25 absent permission for additional
interrogatories by the court). While specific discovery sanctions focus on failures to
provide information or appear for a proceeding, see FED. R. Civ. P. 37, discovery requests
submitted for improper purposes may result in sanctions under the court's general
powers. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
37. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 23, at 52.
38. Id. For an interesting example of how pleadings serve this function in a
contemporary context, see Barnett v. Obama, No. SACV 09-0082 DOC, 2009 WL
3861788 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009) (dismissing complaint brought by soldier seeking to
avoid deploying overseas until "questions" regarding veracity of President Obama's
birthplace could be resolved). See also Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2009)
(upholding dismissal on grounds that voter's worries about future impeachment or
eligibility to hold office did not create standing to seek declaratory judgment on
presidential candidate's eligibility to run for office).
39. Clark, supra note 35, at 456.
8 [Vol. 115:1
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allegations could greatly damage a defendant. 4 0 Even in these special
cases, matters about which a plaintiff simply could not know details,
such as malice, intent, knowledge, and conditions of mind, could be
"alleged generally."A
Since discovery facilitated the process by which disputed issues
could be refined and final judgment could be rendered, Clark viewed it
not as a problem associated with conclusory allegations, but as a solution
42to them. Discussing allegations of conscious parallelism in the antitrust
context and their evaluation on a motion to dismiss, Clark suggested that
"it is quite apparent that the real objection is not failure to state a
claim ... it is rather the lack of detail which defendant seeks and the
court thinks he should have. But this, where really needed, is to be
secured directly and simply by pre-trial conference or discovery."43
The principle that pleadings should be not be asked to do the work
of discovery or a decision on the merits was reinforced by the Court's
decision in Conley v. Gibson that "a complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief."4 4 The Court went further to reject the contention
that a complaint should "set forth specific facts to support its general
allegations," stating "the decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts
upon which he bases his claim." 4 5 Rather, "all the Rules require is a
'short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests."4 6 Similarly, in reviewing the sufficiency of the factual allegations
considered in a complaint, the Court would not test them against its own
experience, but presume them to be true.47 Where allegations were too
ambiguous to allow a coherent response, defendants were to avail
themselves of a motion for a more definite statement.4 8 Conley, in short,
may have accurately reflected the conceptual foundations of the adoption
of the Rules.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 9 (requiring certain matters such as fraud or mistake to be plead
with specificity).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (allowing conditions of mind to be pled generally).
42. See Clark, supra note 23, at 52.
43. Id.
44. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
45. Id. at 47.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 172 (1967).
48. See United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n of Chicago, 347 U.S. 186, 189
(1954). In exceptionally broad language, the Court went on to say that where a complaint
charged every element of an offense, "summary dismissal of a civil case for failure to set
out evidential facts can seldom be justified." Id.
2010] 9
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Early challenges to the liberal pleading standards laid out in Conley
and other decisions from the 1950's often arose in contexts where the
risk of errors would be particularly costly to defendants. 4 9 In the anti-
trust context, defendants argued that the potential for treble damages
after trial warranted a "heightened pleading standard" at the motion to
dismiss.so Other defendants argued that "jurisdictional facts" must be
pled with particularity in order to justify their being brought to court.5 '
While defendants made some headway in lower courts establishing
heightened pleading standards, particularly where they would have
recourse to various immunity doctrines at trial or where the risk of
spurious litigation was high,52 the Court's decision in Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit brought a
halt to this process. 3 In Leatherman, the Court considered whether a
plaintiff in a § 1983 suit could be required to plead facts with
particularity where a defendant would have immunity from the suit
absent particular circumstances. 54  The Fifth Circuit, reasoning that
immunity from liability would mean little if a government entity could
still be forced to engage in time consuming and costly discovery, had
required plaintiffs to plead with particularity the facts which would
negate this immunity.55  The Court, however, came to a different
conclusion. In a unanimous opinion, stated that "the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts
upon which he bases his claim," that the Federal Rules do impose a
particularity requirement in "two specific instances," cases of fraud or
mistake, and that according to the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius," no other heightened pleading standards could be imposed by
judicial decision. 6 Subsequently, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, the Court
held that a complaint need not allege specific facts sufficient to support a
circumstantial prima facie case against a defendant where direct proof
49. See Clark, supra note 23, at 48 (discussing example cases).
50. See, e.g., Hathaway Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 18 F.R.D. 283 (D.
Conn. 1955).
51. See, e.g., Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1944).
52. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Avita, 871 F.2d 552, 554 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that
§ 1983 claims require "claimant to state specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations"
to overcome official immunity); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (stating that
securities fraud claimants must plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter to
ward off allegations of fraud in hindsight).
53. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163 (1993).
54. Id. at 166-67.
55. See Rodriguez, 871 F.2d at 554.
56. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)).
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might suffice instead. Both cases applied a straight forward
understanding of Rule 8, with the first rejecting case by case conflations
of Rule 8 and Rule 9 and the second rejecting a requirement that a
pleader must plead more than would have to be proved.
During this same period, doubts were being raised about the ability
of judges to effectively control process costs through pre-trial
conferences and managed discovery, 8 thus calling into question the
conceptual foundations of the existing procedural regime. Critics of
expansive discovery, like Judge Easterbrook, pointed out that liberal
pleading standards, combined with expansive discovery, gave plaintiffs
significant leverage over defendants in cases where discovery costs
would be disproportionately borne by the latter. 59 While the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit the filing of motions for "any improper
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation"60 and charged courts with trimming back
and sanctioning such abusive requests, 61 Easterbrook argued that it was
impossible because of informational asymmetries for judges or
magistrates to effectively identify these requests.62 When the leverage
provided by asymmetric discovery costs was combined with the
potentially ruinous damages which could flow from a case, even deep-
pocketed defendants whose liability was unclear were often "under
intense pressure to settle" claims.63
B. The Conceptual Foundations Reconsidered
The implications of this history are clear. In a world of symmetrical
information and low transaction costs, the Conley gloss on the Federal
Rules most likely accomplished the goal of facilitating the accurate and
efficient resolution of disputes without distorting the underlying
substantive law, values that the procedural regime the Federal Rules
57. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 508, 511-12 (2002).
58. See, e.g. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 635 (1989).
See also FRCP Amendments, supra note 32, at 1000, n. 1 (Powell, J dissenting).
59. Easterbrook, supra note 58, at 636. See generally William M. Landes, An
Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61 (1971) (discussing problem of in
terrorum value of claims and coerced settlement); Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution,
Bargaining and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and
Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (1988) (cataloguing commentary on Landes'
original proposal).
60. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1).
61. See FED. R.Civ.P. I1(c)&26(g).
62. See Easterbrook, supra note 58, at 638.
63. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995). See
also, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) ("the threat of discovery
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching
those proceedings").
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replaced did not adequately secure. If the original assumptions about
litigation are true, procedural wrangling is largely a dead weight social
cost, serving no good purpose. Increasing the cost of resolving disputes,
unnecessary procedural wrangling makes the underlying substantive
right less valuable, which can distort substantive law. This is where the
procedural regime begins to intersect the evidentiary regime. It is
plausible that the standard of proof in civil cases of a preponderance of
the evidence as a general matter optimizes social value,64 but, under
certain simplifying assumptions, it can only do so if the cases brought to
trial are not a skewed or distorted sample of the underlying disputes that
people have.6 5
However, in a world rife with informational and economic
asymmetry, the application of an interpretation of a rule constructed for a
different context could ultimately have just the opposite effect of being
socially perverse. If the procedural regime creates distortions in the
cases that are brought to trial, there may be no good reason to believe
that the preponderance standard is optimal. Prior to the Federal Rules
being adopted, perhaps procedural costs systematically disfavored
plaintiffs.6 6 If the status of plaintiff and defendant are not random (e.g.
more pedestrians than car drivers deserve to recover for accidents, and
thus more pedestrians sue car drivers than vice versa), then the effect of
the procedural regime, coupled with applying the standard evidentiary
64. On certain assumptions, the preponderance of the evidence standard minimizes
expected errors, which, in turn, might reduce actual errors. David H. Kaye, The Limits of
the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiable Naked Statistical Evidence and
Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487 (1982). The preponderance
standard may also cause most cases to be settled where the facts are relatively clear.
Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
That in turn may optimize socially useful activity. There are numerous complexities
here. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, The Error of Expected Loss Minimization, 2 LAW,
PROBABILITY & RISK 1 (2003); Ronald J. Allen, Clarifying the Burden ofPersuasion and
Bayesian Decision Rules: A Response to Professor Kaye, 4 INT'L. J. OF EVIDENCE AND
PROOF 246-259 (2000); Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is
Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (1966).
65. More precisely, the question is the effect of litigated cases on primary behavior.
We simplify this question in the text, but it should be noted that the policy should be to
encourage the litigation of those cases which will optimize primary behavior. That may
involve the simplified assumptions of the text, but it may not. For example, a skewed set
of cases at trial may result in optimizing the much larger set of non-litigated cases. For
an excellent discussion of the effect of burdens of proof on primary activity, see Chris
William Sanchirico, A Primary-Activity Approach to Proof Burden, 37 J. LEGAL STUD.
273 (2008) (distinguishing between litigation as a search for truth and litigation as a
means to regulate behavior).
66. See Marcus, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 23 at 1753 (discussing rise and fall
of fact pleading prior to Federal Rules).
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rules, could be to undermine the substantive law. 6 7 In the car example,
car drivers would not be adequately internalizing the costs of their
behavior if too many at-fault drivers escape liability because of litigation
costs of plaintiffs. The adoption of the Federal Rules may very well have
rectified this in part by clearing away some procedural impediments to
accurate adjudication that favored defendants.
Note another aspect of the assumptions underlying the adoption of
the Rules: if information is evenly dispersed and cheap to obtain, the
procedural regime can largely ignore the evidence and proceed on the
assumption that judges should make no fact-based decisions which
would terminate trial prior to the discovery process. In such a world, it is
perfectly plausible to adopt the Conley gloss that cases can only be
dismissed on the pleadings if there is no possible state of affairs
consistent with liability. This directly serves the important goal of
ensuring that a complaint properly frames the legal question and allows
for the application of res judicata, which, in a costless regime, may be
the primary purpose of pleading.68
Now, fast forward to the present. As foreshadowed by Judge
Easterbook's concerns, culminating in Iqbal and Twombly, there has
been a growing belief (whether empirically accurate or not) that the
assumptions about knowledge and cost are not true in some set of
cases.69 Knowledge may not be symmetrically distributed, and discovery
costs may be large relative to the value of claims, and also
asymmetrically distributed. Applying the Conley gloss in that subset of
cases may not further the underlying purpose of accurate and efficient
adjudication, and may undermine the original achievements of the Rules
67. Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v.
Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FL. L. REV. 1 (2010) (argues that pleading imposes costs
and due process constrains the costs that can be imposed on individuals). The problem is
that the almost limitless ability of legislatures to impose costs and determine distributions
of errors in civil cases is virtually unquestioned. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). Nonetheless, the argument has the one similarity to ours of
emphasizing the differing costs that different pleading regimes impose and suggesting
that the cases may be responding to that notion. Perhaps the author is correct that the
conventional understanding should be rethought.
68. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) (stating that a complaint
contains sufficient specificity when it "give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests"); Charles E. Clark, Simplified
Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 456-57 (1941) (suggesting proper role of pleadings was to
channel claims to the proper adjudicative body and to allow the application of res
judicata).
69. Indeed, by the time of Twombly, the Court felt it was "self-evident" that the
"problem" of discovery abuse could not be resolved by judicial management and it
identified a string of its own precedents in which additional information was demanded
from plaintiffs in order to clear the motion to dismiss. See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 559-60 (2007).
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by misallocating errors and correct outcomes. That, in turn, will
undermine the substantive law.
In some cases, perhaps the positions of plaintiff and defendant have
been inverted from what was believed to be the pre-Rules situation,
which in turn may justify more intense scrutiny of these complaints.
Whereas the pre-Rules procedural regime favored defendants, and thus
subsidized socially wasteful activity, now, in some set of cases, perhaps
it favors plaintiffs with the opposite effect. In such cases, defendants
will be deterred from productive activities, not by the law, but by
litigation costs that increase the in terrorum value of even meritless suits
that put pressure on a defendant to settle70 and burden otherwise lawful
conduct.7 1 Potential defendants will engage in litigation avoidance
tactics that are likely to be socially wasteful, and they will settle to avoid
litigation costs rather than risk liability on the merits.72 This increases
the cost of conduct, which is not itself actionable, but which might
appear indistinguishable from that which is actionable, if a complaint is
drawn with a high degree of generality.
Of course, the reverse might also be true. Mandating even the
Conley standard might insulate too many defendants from liability, and
70. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 ("[Ilt is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an
antitrust complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that proceeding
with antitrust discovery can be expensive.") (citation omitted).
71. Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 1, at 903 (suggesting that without adequate
protections for defendants, discovery costs may constitute a violation of due process
rights).
72. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ("[The] potential expense [of discovery] is
obvious enough in the present case: plaintiffs represent a putative class of at least 90
percent of all subscribers to local telephone or high-speed Internet service in the ...
United States, in an action against America's largest telecommunications firms . .. for
unspecified . . . instances of antitrust violations that allegedly occurred over a period of
seven years."); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) ("Our rejection of the
careful-case-management approach is especially important in suits where Government-
official defendants are entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity. The basic
thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of
litigation, including 'avoidance of disruptive discovery."'). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559,
("[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even
anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.").
73. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554 ("The inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or
interdependence, without more, mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior: consistent with
conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive
business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.") (citation
omitted). While it may be easy to dismiss this concern where defendants are large
corporations with deep pockets and highly competent legal representations, one need only
consider the lot of a college student served with papers from the RIAA to appreciate how
this settlement pressure effects large and small alike. See Electronic Frontier Foundation,
RIAA v. the Students: An FAQ for "Pre-Lawsuit" Letter Targets, available at
http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/RIAAv_ThePeople/college_faq.php (discussing RIAA offers of
pre-litigation settlement).
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in such cases applying the general approach the Court has now fashioned
should result in even less scrutiny of complaints than Conley mandates.
Interestingly, that is already the case. Complaints relying on res ipsa
loquitur involve situations where the plaintiff does not know what
happened and thus cannot possibly in good faith assert a set of facts
consistent with liability, yet such complaints survive the pleading stage.74
Alternatively, such cases may involve, a priori, quite plausible stories of
liability, justifying proceeding to the next stage of the litigation
process.75 In a critical fashion, the res ipsa cases anticipate our general
point about the significance of a dynamic rule, and thus may be
precursors to Iqbal and Twombly, which can be seen not as
revolutionary, but as applying the very same dynamic conception that
long ago recalibrated the relationship between the parties in res ipsa
cases in order to optimize the objectives of the legal system. Moreover,
this remains true whether such cases are understood as manipulating
pleadings, relying on presumptions, or burden shifts, for the
consequences are precisely the same: A set of cases that would have not
survived the pleading stage, if the rules are treated as static, is permitted
to survive.
Can Iqbal and Twombly bear this weight? We now turn to them.
C. History Repeats Itself Maybe
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly brought these matters to a head.76 The
case considered whether a Sherman Act § 1 complaint could survive a
74. Erickson is, as Prof. Bone has noted, a prime example of this, since liability turns
on facts and mental states which are outside of the plaintiffs knowledge. See Bone,
Pleading Rules, supra note I at 886 and accompanying footnotes.
75. The case of the plaintiff injured by a barrel which fell from a hoist found in
Byrne v. Boadle provides a classic of example of this. Byme v. Boadle, (1863), 159 Eng.
Rep. 299 (Court of Exchequer). Without discovery a pedestrian injured by a runaway
barrel could only allege that he had been injured, that he had been injured by the barrel,
and that the barrel had been in the sole control of the warehouse owner. As Baron
Pollock explained in his opinion, to require the plaintiff to establish the particular nature
of the duty breached and the particular acts which led to the breach would be pointless as
these would almost invariably be the acts and duties of the defendant.
76. There were related statutory developments that are analytically identical to the
present problem, but, being statutory amendments, do not raise the same interpretive
problem. In response to concerns about the "abusive practices" discussed in the text,
Congress acted to pass bills like the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).
See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (CoNF. REP.) ("The private securities litigation
system is too important to the integrity of American capital markets to allow this system
to be undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing abusive and
meritless suits."), which required plaintiffs to plead "particular" facts which gave rise to a
"strong inference" of a defendant's fraudulent intent when alleging securities fraud. 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). While this measure offered some protection to apparently law-
abiding companies that might otherwise be burdened with the cost of defending against
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motion to dismiss where it alleged parallel conduct, but failed to present
some "factual context suggesting agreement" in violation of the act.n
The Court concluded that, in order survive a motion to dismiss, a § 1
claim must state "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an
agreement was made."78 The Court cautioned that this requirement did
not "impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage" or demand
"detailed factual allegations," but it did require "more than labels and
conclusions [ ] and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action."79  According to the Court, the test was not whether it was
possible that the plaintiff deserved recovery, but rather, was it
plausible.80  The plausibility inquiry "simply calls for enough fact to
such litigation, see Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81
(2006), it also raised a new question: how was a court to test the strength of inferences in
a complaint where all allegations of fact were presumed to be true?
It was this "strong inference" language which the PSLRA incorporated into statute
and which was at issue in the Tellabs case. The Court concluded that to survive a motion
to dismiss under the PSLRA, a plaintiff must allege facts from which "a reasonable
person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any
opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged." Id. at 324. In conducting this
inquiry, a court should "accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true," it must
consider the "complaint in its entirety" along with "other sources courts ordinarily
examine" when making such rulings, and in determining whether the allegations give rise
to a "strong inference of scienter," the court should take into account "plausible opposing
inferences." Id. at 322-23.
Critical to the Court's adoption of a comparative test was its belief that "the strength
of an inference cannot be decided in a vacuum." Id. at 323. Finding the inquiry
"inherently comparative," it reasoned that to determine whether a plaintiff had created a
strong inference "a court must consider plausible nonculpable explanations for the
defendant's conduct, as well as inferences favoring the plaintiff." Id. at 323-24. While
an inference need not be "irrefutable," it must be more than merely "reasonable," it must
be "cogent," and "at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from
the facts alleged." Id. at 324. The plaintiff, after all, should not be required to plead
more then he must prove at trial. Id. Interestingly, in concurrences that took issue with
the characterization of a "strong inference" as one which was "at least as compelling" as
alternatives, Justices Scalia and Alito argued not that the term "strong" did not imply a
comparison, but that the statute called for the plaintiffs inference to be the "strongest."
Id. at 329-30, 333 (Scalia, J., concurring), 333-34 (Alito, J., concurring). Further, Justice
Alito would only have given consideration to facts "alleged with particularity" when
considering whether the "allegations of scienter" were sufficient. Id. at 333.
There are obvious analytical similarities between these developments and the
interpretations of Rule 8. We put them aside only because the Court is addressing
different statutes and rules. However, plainly our analysis easily extends to these
developments as well, including our analysis that the Court's use of terms and concepts is
not terribly felicitous. One difficulty here is that the task the Court is engaged in-the
regulation of inference-is exceedingly difficult for anyone, let alone those not expert in
it, as the members of the Supreme Court are not. We discuss some of this further in Sec.
IV, infra.
77. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.
78. Id. at 556.
79. Id. at 555-56.
80. See id. at 570.
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raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
illegal agreement."81
Against a background of substantive law that would not have
allowed the plaintiff s claim to survive a motion for summary judgment
or directed verdict based only on proof of parallel conduct,82 the Court
explained that "an allegation of parallel conduct is thus much like a
naked assertion of conspiracy in a § 1 complaint: it gets the complaint
close to stating a claim, but without some factual enhancement it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief."8 3 In the antitrust context, the Court had already "hedged against
false inference from identical behavior ... at a number of points in the
trial sequence."84
As the Court said, "it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing
an antitrust complaint in advance of discovery ... but quite another to
forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive."85 In light
of the "common lament" that judicial oversight of the discovery process
was ineffective, only by engaging in an inquiry into the plausibility of a
complaint could a court "hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense
of discovery in cases with no reasonably founded hope that the discovery
process will reveal relevant evidence."8 6 The fatal flaw in the plaintiffs
complaint was not that they had failed to allege agreement, but that they
had failed to include other allegations to render it plausible.
While Twombly appeared to impose a heightened pleading standard
for antitrust cases, the Court distinguished its decision from that in
Swierkiewicz, where the Court explicitly rejected a "heightened pleading
standard" that required a plaintiff to plead a prima facie circumstantial
case when he might establish his case by direct evidence at trial.88
Reiterating that "we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics"
in § 1 cases, the Court in Twombly explained that it was only requiring
the plaintiffs to state "a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 89 In
the process of reaching this conclusion, the Court also devoted several
paragraphs to excoriating Justice Black's opinion in Conley as poorly
grounded in the Federal Rules and "as an incomplete, negative gloss on
an accepted pleading standard" which dealt more with the manner in
81. Id.at556.
82. See id. at 553-54 (citing Theatre Enterp., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,
346 U.S. 537 (1954)).
83. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 559.
87. See id. at 570.
88. Id. at 569 (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515).
89. Id. at 570.
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which a complaint could be supported by discovery than its initial
sufficiency. 90
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal the Court was again confronted with the
problem of costly discovery, here measured in terms of the time and
attention of senior government officials, and broad allegations in a
complaint.91 The plaintiff in Iqbal was a Pakistani national arrested in
the wake of the September 11th attacks and confined in harsh conditions
at a federal facility in Brooklyn, New York.92 In a Bivens suit he named
both his jailers and former FBI head Robert Mueller and former Attorney
General Richard Ashcroft as defendants. He alleged that the abuse he
suffered at the hands of federal employees was delivered pursuant to a
policy implemented from the highest levels of government. 94 The district
court refused to grant a motion to dismiss claims against Mueller and
Ashcroft, and the Second Circuit, applying what it termed Twombly's
"flexible plausibility standard," determined that the allegations against
the two officials did not arise in a context where legal conclusions
required factual "amplification." 95
The Court reversed. In order to prevail against Ashcroft and
Mueller, Iqbal would be required to establish that both implemented the
policy by which he was detained and that both acted with the specific
intent of violating his rights or those of others similarly situated.96 Such
intent, the Court concluded, could not be alleged in a "conclusory"
fashion. 9 7 Clarifying the nature of the "plausibility" inquiry proposed by
Twombly, the Court explained that two "working principles" had
underpinned its holding.98 The first principle is "the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions."99 Second, "only a complaint that
states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss."' 00
Determining whether a complaint states a "plausible claim for relief' is a
"context specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense,"' 0 but where the "well pleaded
90. Id. at 560-64.
91. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (discussing "heavy costs in
terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise
be directed to the proper execution of the work of the Government").
92. See id. at 1943.
93. Id. at 1943-45.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1944-45.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1951.
98. Id. at 1949.
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facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but has not 'shown' that the
pleader is entitled to relief."' 02  In considering the plausibility of a
complaint, the first step is "identifying pleadings that, because they are
no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth" and
then identifying a second set of pleadings that "are well-pleaded factual
allegations" which the court should assume to be true.10 3 The court
should then consider this second class of allegations and "determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."l 04
Applying this "two pronged" approach, the Court determined that
the plaintiff had not "nudged" his claim "across the line from
conceivable to plausible." 0 5  The Court first identified allegations as
mere "formulaic recitation of elements" of a claiml 06 that the two
officials "knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to
subject [plaintiff]" to harsh conditions "as a matter of policy solely on
account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no
legitimate penalogical interest" and his allegations that Ashcroft that "the
principle architect" of the policy and that Mueller was "instrumental" in
adopting it.'ov Considering the "factual" allegations concerning specific
details of the policy, which pertained both to his arrest and his
confinement, the Court concluded that in the wake of the September 11th
attacks, both his arrest and his confinement were more likely the result.of
legitimate government interests than a "purposeful discrimination."10 8 In
concluding its opinion, the Court rejected Iqbal's arguments that
Twombly should be confined to the antitrust context, that application of
the plausibility standard should be tempered by the ability of the court to
"cabin" discovery in a way that preserved "petitioner's defense of
qualified immunity," or that Rule 9 allowed him to allege
"discriminatory intent generally."109 Illuminating this last point, the
Court explained that while Rule 9(b) allowed malice, intent, knowledge
and other conditions of a person's mind to be alleged generally,
"'generally' is a relative term" and while it carved an exception into the
heightened standards of Rule 9, it had no bearing on the dictates of Rule
8.110
102. Id. at 1950 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
103. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950
104. Id.




109. Id. at 1953.
110. Id. at 1954.
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We will return below to a scrutiny of the legal tests articulated by
the Court, but it is obvious from these two cases that one possible
inference to draw is that the Court was transmuting Rule 8 from the
formality of Conley into a requirement of substantive engagement with
evidentiary matters at an earlier time in the process."' That
understanding, though, is hard to reconcile with Erickson v. Pardus.112
Erickson involved a § 1983 action by a prisoner alleging substantial
harm caused by the prison authorities who failed to treat his medical
condition." 3  The lower courts had dismissed the complaint on the
grounds that the complaint contained only conclusory allegations. In a
per curiam opinion issued within weeks of Twombly, the Court reversed,
concluding that, in this case, the allegations were sufficient, even though
there was no allegation that plaintiffs condition suffered as a result of
his treatment rather than simply from the disease itself.1 14
These cases simply cannot be reconciled on an understanding of
Rule 8 as articulating a defined standard applicable to a static
environment. It is quite obvious that Twombly and Iqbal impose more
difficult to meet pleading standards than Erickson. However, these cases
can be reconciled on an understanding of Rule 8 as applying a dynamic
standard in a dynamic environment. Twombly and Iqbal involved cases
where the original assumptions which motivated Conley's interpretation
of the Rules quite possibly were false. If so, applying the static
conception of Rule 8 would have been inconsistent with ultimate
objectives of the pertinent substantive law and would have resulted in
over-deterrence of productive activity-economic activity in the one case
and governmental activity in the other. In contrast, Erickson looks like a
car accident case-knowledge was probably symmetrically distributed
and relatively cheap to come-by, and thus the prior understanding of
Rule 8 was satisfactory.1
If our explanation is correct, when the original assumptions hold,
something like the Conley gloss is appropriate; when they do not, a more
searching inquiry into pleadings is permitted, and maybe mandatory. It
is easy to state how this should work (but, as we discuss below, perhaps
111. This is apparently the conclusion drawn by Sherry, supra note 12, at 29-31.
112. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 90-94.
115. While the underlying issues in Erickson and Iqbal are superficially similar, the
cases differ on critical variables. Erickson was fully aware of the actions underlying his
complaint (although obviously not the intent behind them); there was no risk to national
security, nor any intrusion into highest levels of government. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at
90-92 (discussing contents of pleadings). By contrast, Iqbal's case against senior
officials rested almost entirely on conjecture. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937,
1943-45 (2009) (summarizing pleadings).
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much more difficult to implement). The law (substantive, procedural,
and evidentiary) is concerned with policies, accuracy, and cost. The law
pursues certain substantive outcomes; but for it to do so it must be able to
make reasonably accurate decisions on facts; cost is a variable that can
affect both substantive outcomes and accuracy. At the highest level of
generality, these cases can be understood as adopting a sliding scale-a
dynamic rule-to implement Rule 8 depending upon parameters of the
case before the court. If the objectives of the law are optimized by
applying the Conley gloss, then it is to be applied; and if they are not, it
is not. When the gloss is not applied, the test by which pleadings are to
be judged is whether permitting cases of that sort to go forward with the
kind of pleading before the court will subvert the substantive law as a
result of either cost or informational asymmetries. The level of
specificity and cogency needed to survive a motion to dismiss is the level
that will further the objectives of the substantive law, generally
conceived, and thus the level that will result in the proper balance being
maintained between the parties. This maintains rather than subverts the
incentive structure of the law."16
It is important to see that we are not simply suggesting the
replacement of one static rule with another. The relationship between
information, cost and correct outcomes could be literally anything-that
is one of the implications of the domain of this rule being organic. Thus,
the central problem is optimizing a set of variables rather than deducing
outcomes from a predetermined set of necessary and sufficient
conditions contained in a static rule." 7
116. In his highly informative testimony before Congress, Prof. Burbank objects in
part to the recent cases because of their modification of the Conley standard. See
generally Burbank, supra note 21. This objection may be well taken, but it cannot end
the debate. It equates one interpretation with the meaning of the rule. Another way to
understand an interpretation is that it provides the meaning of the rule in context, and that
when the context changes so do the implications of the rule. Both are "rule-like," and it
is simply a logical error to assert as true that a subsequent interpretation of a rule thought
to be at odds with the first "changes" the rule's meaning. If the rule is dynamic, both
interpretations can be correct. Even if one is not, the question is which interpretation is
correct, not which was first. This is akin to the common error in legal scholarship of
criticizing one case by reference to another, whereas either could be "right" or "wrong."
In any event, the analysis provided here does not claim one is right or wrong but is trying
to explain how both could be right and develop the implications of that point.
117. But see, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion
to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, Illinios Public Law Research Paper No. 09-16
(October 2009), available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract-1494683. We don't think
the Court's recent decisions have simply made the motion to dismiss into summary
judgment; rather, the Court has recognized that whenever it is clear that permitting a case
to go forward is socially perverse, it ought not to go forward, whatever one calls the
process for doing so.
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There are (at least) two difficulties looming. The first is that some
will object that our "explanation" deprives Rule 8 of its rule-like nature,
leaving nothing but a discretionary admonition. The second is that it
acknowledges the piercing of the barrier between evidence and
procedure. We discuss these two points in turn.
III. THE NATURE OF RULES, DISCRETION, AND DYNAMIC SYSTEMS
There are many debates over the nature of rules. The simplest and
most intuitive concept of a rule is a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions which may be applied straightforwardly to their domain so as
to allow deductions to be drawn." 8 This is the concept of rule at play in
games, often in raising children, and predominantly in discussions of
"rule of law."119  The process of generalizing and applying the
generalization at the heart of the concept is probably hardwired in human
brains as it obviously has survival benefits for creatures with limited
intellectual resources encountering a nearly infinite set of threats. 120 If
one's child wanders to the river and gets eaten by a crocodile, one's
DNA is likely to die out quickly unless one internalizes some general
lessons about crocodiles and rivers. There are, however, other kinds of
rules and other kinds of reasoning. Another concept of a rule is a set of
defeasible conditions.' 21 If the river is one's only source of protein,
denying one's children access to it will just as surely lead to one's DNA
dying out, and thus survival depends on something other than the straight
forward deduction from the rule about children, rivers, and crocodiles.122
The simple concept of a rule is an example of monotonic logic, and
defeasible argumentation is an example of nonmonotonic logic. 123
Although not normally put in such terms, many of the modern
jurisprudential arguments over rules are arguments over the virtues and
118. On rules, see GIDON GOTTLIEB, THE LOGIC OF CHOICE (1968); JOSEPH RAZ,
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1999); FRED SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1992);
LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES (2001), Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Fred Schauer &
Larry Alexander, Law's Limited Domain Confronts Morality's Universal Empire, WM. &
MARY L. REv. (forthcoming).
119. See Scalia, supra note 16, at 1175-78.
120. For an interesting discussion of rule based decision making in a psychological
context, see David Shanks & Richard Darby, Feature and Rule Based Generalizations in
Human Associative Learning, 24 J. EXP. PSYCH. 405, 412-414 (1998).
121. See, e.g., LOGICAL MODELS OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION (Henry Prakken &
Giovanni Sarto eds., 1997).
122. See DOUGLAS N. WALTON, ABDUCTIVE REASONING (2004).
123. Under a monotonic system of logic, an original premise remains true, regardless
of the manner in which it is extended by additional axiom. Under a non-monotonic
system, there is no first premise. For additional discussion, see LOGICAL MODELS OF
LEGAL ARGUMENTATION, supra note 121, at 122.
22 [Vol. 115:1
CONLEY AS A SPECIAL CASE OF TWOMBL Y AND IQBAL
vices of these different forms of logic, such as the over- and under-
breadth of rules, rules v. their underlying purposes, rules v. standards,
and so on. Perhaps even less noticed in the current jurisprudential
debates is that the driving force behind these arguments is complexity.124
Monotonic logics work better as their assumptions more accurately
capture the relevant universe of reasons and facts, and thus they work
better in simplified environments such as games. Nonmonotonic logics
work better as the environment becomes more complex, such as in the
efforts to model natural reasoning processes. Thus, much of the debate
over rules and whatever the alternative might be is largely an implicit
discussion about the complexity of the relevant domain and one's
tolerance for mistakes of different kinds.125
From the perspective we are developing, the standard problems with
rules are that there are too many variables, or the variables can take too
many values, to be computationally tractable, and that all the relevant
variables, or some values they may take, were not anticipated in advance.
In either case (computational intractability or failure of imagination),
algorithmic approaches that conceptualize rules as static face the
standard critiques given in the debate over rules that focuses on their
indeterminate nature. The critics of Iqbal/Twombly, working
comfortably within this tradition, claim that the Court has unnecessarily
and inappropriately introduced indeterminateness into Rule 8 by
changing the meaning of the rule through an unjustified interpretation
that changed how certain cases will come out going forward.12 6
The Court's interpretation will indeed affect outcomes, but whether
that is because the Court changed the meaning of Rule 8 is a different
question. The most interesting aspect of the Supreme Court's cases is
that they highlight the difference between static and dynamic rules and
conditions, and the affect of that difference on the meaning of a rule.
Although the normal legal/jurisprudential approaches to rules is that they
have the definite, hypothetico-deductive form as suggested above,
nothing in the nature of a rule says whether that form is to be applied to
pre-existing facts, as is normally implicit in the rule debates, or instead as
124. Indeed, there is virtually no discussion within the jurisprudential literature of this
type of complexity of which we are aware.
125. Another aspect of the debate, one championed by Fred Schauer in particular,
focuses on authority. Who gets to decide what kinds of mistakes are made? As he points
out, requiring that rules be followed preserves the authority of the rule maker over that of
the person implementing the rule. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 118, at 112.
126. The first instance of such a criticism came in the dissent to the decision itself.
See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(lamenting the fact that Court had not forced defendants to explain their conduct through
sworn depositions and discovery in favor of resolving the matter using economic
arguments).
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directions about outcomes, as exemplified by the regulation of physical
forces.
Here is a simple example of the difference. Consider the "rule":
"At the end of the day hose down the boat to clean it." The water
pressure from the hose will matter to such a rule. One could further
elaborate the rule in such a form as "turn the spigot two full revolutions
to start the water flow and then hose it down," or one could say "turn the
spigot until the water pressure from the hose is adequate to loosen the
material on the side of the boat but not so strong as to adversely affect
the paint job." The point is that both the precise water pressure from a
hose and the pressure needed to do the job will depend on other variables
than turning the spigot, such as temperature, water pressure in the
system, water usage in the area, the nature of the stuff stuck to the side of
the board, and so on. Many physical forces are like this. For example,
homeostasis in organisms is achieved through dynamic equilibria of
many interacting systems that almost surely could not be reduced to a
computable algorithm. 12 7
There is a rule here to be applied-clean the boat-the objective of
which is quite clear, yet how to accomplish that objective is quite
complicated and depends on the optimizing of a large number of
continuous variables. Apply this to Rule 8. One way to understand the
phrase "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief' is as articulating a specific standard of definiteness
and detail. It is the Court's implicit rejection of that approach which is
causing the storm over its rulings. 128  However, another way to
understand the phrase is as a direction to maintain the equilibria of the
system. As the system changes, so, too, must its regulators to keep it
functioning normally. In this particular case, as developments change
the relative balance between plaintiffs and defendants, the system
responds to reestablish the equilibrium. 129
127. Cognition itself may be better described in dynamical than computational terms.
See, e.g., Tim Van Gelder, What Might Cognition Be, ifNot Computational?, 92 J. PHIL.
345 (1995).
128. See infra Section VI.
129. As we say, this perspective intersects but is quite different from the conventional
jurisprudential argument over rules and standards. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer,
Prescriptions in Three Dimensions, 82 IOWA L. REV. 911 (1997). "Clean the boat" is a
standard, but it is precise, canonical and dispositive, which of course would,
paradoxically, make it a rule in the traditional discourse over rules. As suggested in the
text, we think the traditional debate over rules has missed the most important aspect of
the problem it purports to be addressing (differing levels of specificity and so on), which
is complexity. By missing complexity, it also misses what we are emphasizing in this
article, which is the value of considering contexts, and thus rules, as dynamic. Although
Prof. Schauer does not address the problem of rules from the perspective in the text, he,
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The objections to the Court's cases thus presuppose the nature of a
rule to be of the static rather than dynamic variety. It seems to us that,
while understandable, this presupposition is not a prior obviously
correct. The law has many dynamic rules, such as do not act in restraint
of trade, do not behave negligently, drive at a safe speed and so on. In
the procedural context, the summary judgment rule, FRCP 56, is best
understood as a dynamic rule, as well. Whether there is a genuine issue
of material fact depends on knowledge about the world and a comparison
of the parties' cases, and not just on the documents attached to the
motion. 130 The issue, thus, is whether in the context of pleading a static
or a dynamic conception is better justified, and it is certainly plausible
that a dynamic conception is sensible. Without adjusting to the changing
conditions of the modem legal landscape, the procedural system can
subvert the substantive law, whereas viewing the rules as dynamic
regulators can help achieve substantive objectives. The law is often an
"ass" precisely because of its rigidity, and that rigidity in turn often
comes precisely from assuming that the only form of a rule is a static
one.
It should also be obvious that applying a static conception of Rule 8
may result in radically different consequences in different areas of the
law. Thus, applying a static conception of the rule does not necessarily
manifest rule-like behavior, a point the critics of Iqbal and Twombly have
neglected. Their insistence that "rules" can only be thought of as
deductive commodities ironically can subvert the very rule-like behavior
that motivates their conception of what rules entail. Plainly, individuals
are benefited or hurt as a by-product of the real world setting of the
particular litigation that can be in tension with the intended consequences
of substantive policy choices. The "static" conception of the rule can
result in a dynamic that does not generate uniform or consistent
outcomes. The dynamic conception of Rule 8, by contrast, has the
potential to generate considerably more uniform outcomes, and to that
extent may behave in a considerably more rule-like fashion generating
trans-substantive effects, even if not trans-substantive, in a sense, in
application. Thus, as we say, this tension between the static and the
dynamic generates quite interesting questions about what it means to be a
rule, and the conventional conception of what constitutes a rule that is
too, thinks the distinction between rules and standards is problematic, although obviously
for quite different reasons.
130. See generally Pardo, supra note 17, for a detailed analysis of the similarities,
from the evidentiary perspective, of various procedural devices.
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now dominating the discourse about this problem may lead to suboptimal
results.' 3 1
There is a problem, however, and that is whether the courts can
behave effectively as regulators. The risk is that encouraging them to do
so will result in idiosyncratic judgments that will introduce needless
unequal treatment into the litigation process, which in turn may both
subvert the underlying substantive objectives and undermine the
authority of the judicial system. The fear comes from the Court's
recognition that the "plausibility" of the factual allegations in some cases
must be judged by the common sense and experience of the trial judges,
which seems to the Court's critics as an open-ended invitation for
judicial bias to determine outcomes. 13 2  Indeed, the critics' position
seems to entail that the static conception requires no substantive
engagement with the facts, whereas the dynamic conception does, but at
a time prior to discovery where the facts are not well known, which is the
precise space opened up for judicial bias to be determinative.133  The
critics might have a point were it true that the static conception of Rule 8
requires no engagement with the facts, and thus none with the evidence.
One cannot judge whether there is any possible set of facts upon which
liability might be premised without engaging with the facts and thus with
the evidence. 134 This is another place where the procedural system again
runs into the evidentiary system, to which we now turn. As shall see,
this raises deep questions about the meaning of "fact," and "evidence,"
but they are deep questions which must be addressed to understand the
full implications of what we are examining.
131. It perhaps should be noted that our discussion here about what it means to be
"trans-substantive" has a certain analytical similarity to the arguments over the nature of
equality to the effect that equality is empty without an articulation of the variable to be
equalized. For the classic debate within the law, see Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982), and Steven Burton, Comment on the "Empty
Ideas": Logical Positivist Analysis of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136 (1982).
Similarly, a rule can be applied "trans-substantively" in many different ways with many
different outcomes. Why is applying the Conley gloss in every case trans-substantive, in
other words, rather than attempting to further the values of the litigation system in every
case?
132. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 1, at 535.
133. See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 571 (Stevens, J. dissenting)
(complaining that 'judicial opinion' regarding facts was being used to measure the legal
sufficiency of the complaint). See also, Burbank, supra note 1, at 535.
134. Prof. Burbank, an esteemed expert on civil procedure, testified before Congress
that Rule 8 was intended to be limited to testing the formal contours of a complaint. See
Burbank, supra note 21, at 11. This does not appear to be an accurate description of how
the courts proceed, however. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice
Pleading, 45 ARiz. L. REv. 987 (2003).
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IV. PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
The central problem we have identified is that continuing to apply a
rule constructed on one set of assumptions when those assumptions have
changed may lead to unintended consequences. In the pleading context,
this problem cannot be solved formally. It requires knowledge of the
litigated case. Maybe antitrust cases do pose too large a risk for
defendants, but how does one know that, and how does one know if the
case before the court is an exception? Maybe allowing cases involving
high governmental officials to proceed to discovery would create
perverse disincentives, but again, how does one know? The assumption
that evidence can be ignored does not hold in some set of cases, but this
produces the apparent anomaly that in those cases motions on pleadings
involve substantive, not just formal, engagement with the case being
litigated prior to discovery. It also instantiates the deepest conceptual
problem of the evidentiary regime, which is that, because evidence is
highly contingent, to know anything one must know everything.135 This
seems to produce the paradox that to decide cases on the pleadings
requires that they be decided on the merits, and that in turn requires
having all the information about the particular case. Because motions on
the sufficiency of Rule 8 are made pre-discovery, we return once again to
the critics' concern that the Court's interpretation of Rule 8 opens up a
large space for judicial bias What other possible basis could there be, the
argument goes. The courts will not be able to decide on the facts
because they will have no evidence before them; therefore, decision can
only be based on bias, whim, or caprice. By contrast, the implicit
argument goes, deciding whether there is any set of facts upon which
liability may rest requires no engagement with the facts, and thus opens
little space for bias.
It is important to see why the critics' implicit belief that the Conley
gloss on Rule 8 ruled out engagement with the "facts" and "evidence" is
wrong, unless, as noted above, Rule 8 simply permits a formal, logical
analysis of the sufficiency of the allegations of the elements of causes of
action. If the Conley gloss allows something in addition to that, the
additional something must have some connection to the facts. The belief
to the contrary rests upon the view that, pre-discovery, there is no
evidence to consider, and therefore there are no factual findings to
make. 13 6 This makes deep mistakes about both "evidence" and "facts."
135. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 Nw.
U. L. REv. 604, 616-30 (1994).
136. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 574-75 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (discussing
historic rejection of concept of "facts" during the analysis of pleadings under the early
Federal Rules).
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First, it equates "evidence" with information formally transmitted
from one person to another, such as producing in discovery or adducing
at trial.'3 7  This is, to be sure, a quite conventional view of what
"evidence" means. It is also highly misleading. "Evidence" is not
packets of information. Those packets of information are completely
meaningless unless analyzed by a human bringing to bear a vast
conceptual apparatus including such things as the meaning of language,
rules of logic, expectations and beliefs about the real world, and so on.
"Evidence" is thus not things produced at discovery or trial but the
consequence of an interaction between those things and all the cognitive
capacities of a person.138  The barest bones complaint a la Conley
involves factual allegations about the world that are understood and then
appraised by reference to someone's conceptual and cognitive apparatus.
For example, a complaint about a car crash tells the judge that someone
is asserting two cars came into contact resulting in damage the liability
for which is now being contested. Such "factual" allegations trigger a
multitude of responses about how likely such things are in the real world,
whether the disincentives to bringing suit increase their probability or
plausibility, whether the possibility of the case being meritorious justifies
further expense, and so on. The point, in other words, is that even a
Conley complaint requires the court to consider its factual allegations
from the perspective of the judge's background and experience. A judge
who says that there is no possible set of facts upon which God may be
sued for damages, or President Obama enjoined from exercising the
powers of the Presidency, is engaging in a factual inquiry analytically
identical to that required by Iqbal and Twombly.
The difference is only that the same background and experience
necessary to make sense of whatever the parties produce may tell us that
some sets of cases differ from others. In some cases, bare bones
allegations may further the objectives of the legal system and in others
they will not. To be sure, how any particular judge will reach decisions
137. See, e.g., Whether the Supreme Court Has Limited Americans'Access to Court:
Hearing Before the Sen. Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 111-530 at 317 (2009)
(letter of Tobias Wolff):
The pleading stage of a lawsuit is entirely different. There is no evidence at the
pleading stage-only a sketch of what the plaintiff will later prove. Under a
notice pleading system, the plaintiff is neither required nor expected to include
any evidence with her complaint, and a skeptical court cannot dismiss the
complaint "even if it appears that a recovery is very remote and unlikely."
(citations omitted).
This is the conventional view, but it is erroneous. While there may not be "evidence" at
the pleading stage, there is a daunting amount of information, including, for example,
whether a plaintiff is willing to bring a lawsuit, whether a defendant is willing to settle,
and so on.
138. For a discussion, see Allen, supra note 135, at 605.
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will be determined in part by that judge's background and experience,
but that is true whether operating under the Conley or the revised Rule 8
gloss. In both cases, judges will be engaging in identical intellectual
exercises. There may be a difference in degree between the two, but
there is no difference in kind. In both cases, judges will be considering
the "evidence" that can be gleaned from the pleadings, judged through
the lens of their life experiences.
But, if judges have greater authority to stop cases from proceeding,
won't that change the way things are operating now? The answer is yes,
of course, but whether that is beneficial or lamentable depends on how
things are operating now, which is the point we were at pains to make in
Section III and will not repeat here. We will summarize it, though, by
noting that one cannot criticize the Court simply for not following a rule;
one must engage with the consequences of differing meanings of the
rule. If in some set of cases the legal system now creates perverse
incentives in part because of an interpretation of the pleading rules, it has
139
perverse consequences to maintain that interpretation.
Still, as power to dismiss cases on the pleadings increases, the
critics fear a commensurate increase in the significance of the judge's
background and experience and decrease in the significance of what
should be paramount, which are the facts of the case.14 0 In essence, the
concern is the cognitive capacity of individual trial judges to get it
"right." This concern rests in turn on the image of the solitary judge
pondering in chambers what to do, where the judge's own background,
knowledge, experience, and predilections will critically determine the
outcome. These factors surely will influence the outcome, but the image
of the solitary decision maker neglects the role of the parties. The
litigation process is largely comparative with the parties advancing their
contrasting claims, adducing evidence (both before and at trial), and
arguing for outcomes.14' And-critically--deciding how much to invest
in any particular procedural stop along the way. It is hard to imagine
anyone more informed about the risks and costs of error, the ease of
investigation, and the policies at stake than the parties; and they can, and
do, present such matters at all stages of the proceedings, including the
motion to dismiss.
139. The potential impact of Iqbal and Twombly on the value of intellectual property
rights provides an interesting example of this effect. See, e.g., Benjamin W. Cheesbro, A
Pirate's Treasure?: Heightened Pleading Standards for Copyright Infringement
Complaints After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 241, 251 (2009).
140. See, e.g., supra note 131 and accompanying citations.
141. See Allen, supra note 135 at 606-612; see also, Allen & Pardo, infra note 157, at
1797-1800.
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Rather than a solitary judge having to make wise choices, at the
pleading stage, as at trial, a decision will be made largely over the cases
as presented by the parties, and thus the concern about idiosyncratic
decision making should instead be a concern about the competence of the
parties. If they are reasonably competent, the litigation process provides
an effective means to educate the judiciary about just the kinds of
variables that motivated the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal and
interestingly over time to do so in a finely tuned way that could
approximate or perhaps even exceed the capacity of the rule making or
legislative process. 14 2 One would predict some idiosyncratic outcomes-
mistakes are difficult to avoid in any complex system-but the question
of the overall operation of these two regulatory regimes is at a minimum
open. Parties may now have an extra burden to showing why they are
within the Conley gloss, or even if within the Iqbal/Twombly gloss that
nonetheless the case should proceed, but they also have the opportunity
to meet that burden by producing more "evidence" in their pleadings. If
parties fear a "biased" reaction to a bare bones pleading, they can
provide considerably more than they otherwise would. Again, this can
only be rationally criticized on the ground that empirically it leads to
perverse results. It cannot rationally be criticized on the ground that the
intellectual task is somehow different under Iqbal/Twombly.
To be sure, a party cannot provide pre-discovery the evidence that it
can only get through discovery, but that does not mean that it should be
able to impose those costs if the best understanding of the world, all
things considered, is that doing so is likely enough to be perverse rather
than socially useful. That does not necessarily mean that such cases can
never be brought. It may mean that in some sets of cases plaintiffs will
have to establish that the entire set should be allowed to proceed. This,
again, is nothing new to the system. Similarly, plaintiffs in some sets of
cases may need to creatively explain how costs can be controlled in such
a fashion so as to reduce the perverse effect and that doing so is likely
enough to produce useful information of liability that it makes sense to
proceed to the next round of litigation.14 3 And there are other means of
142. The relative virtues and vices of the common law is a perennial topic. See, e.g.,
Frank B. Cross, Identifying the Virtues of the Common Law, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 21
(2007). The question of whether judicial or legislative supervision of pleading is
preferable is explored in a dialogue between Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck, and
Stephen B. Burbank. Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal,
PENNumbra (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=24.
143. This is the solution to the analytical problem of the contingency of evidence.
Within the field of evidence, the analogue is conditional relevancy. See FED. R. EVID.
104 ("[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court.. . .").
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limiting the idiosyncratic rules of trials judges. 144  It is critical to
remember, though, that plaintiffs impose costs on defendants and in
many cases wrongfully. It is thus not sufficient to point out that some
rule, or rule change, may hurt plaintiffs; the question is whether the rule
as interpreted and applied optimizes the values of the legal system. 145
In sum, it is not obvious that Iqbal/Twombly changed the
intellectual task of the trial judge qualitatively rather than simply
recognizing that the intellectual task may vary quantitatively with the
case before the court. 14 6 This would simply make evident that the parties
and trial court must invest those resources that are adequate to suggest,
plausibly, that allowing a case to proceed is not socially perverse in the
sense we have identified. 14 7 In any event, we would predict that in most
cases there will be no change from the present understanding of Rule 8,
as most cases probably are quite similar to the original assumptions of
the rules. 14 8 Nonetheless, some cases may appear more like Iqbal than
Erickson, and in those cases a dynamic conception of Rule 8 will be
applied.
V. WHAT THE COURT SAID
The Court did not use our terminology to decide its cases, but it
certainly hinted strongly at adopting our conceptual apparatus. The
central problem in Twombly, thought the Court, was that "the threat of
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even
anemic cases. . . . Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require
allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to
144. Appellate oversight and legislative change (with its attendant legislative
investigation) are always available to make adjustments. See generally supra note 76 and
accompanying discussion of PSLRA. See also, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
(empowering sua sponte dismissal of in forma pauperis suits brought by prisoners which
are deemed by a court to be lacking legal or factual support).
145. One response to the Court's cases has been to propose controlled discovery. See,
e.g., Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1 (2010). This is
isomorphic to our proposed understanding of Rule 8. It recognizes the dynamic nature of
the system and proposes a rule based authorization to do what the Court has construed
Rule 8 to require. Whether an explicit authorizing of formal discovery compared to the
incentive to engage in other kinds of information gathering is more or less optimizing is
an empirical question. The important point to see, though, is that such proposals
implicitly embrace the analysis we have provided here.
146. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) ("[djetermining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense").
147. See generally Pardo, supra note 17. One option is to require an explanation as
how discovery will reveal adequate evidence.
148. For obvious reasons, there will be a lot of cases now dealing with Iqbal and
Twombly. Lots of citations do not equate with substantial substantive change. As many
people have said, though, making predictions is difficult, especially about the future.
20 10] 3 1
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no
'reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal
relevant evidence."'l 4 9  In Iqbal, the Court emphasized that "we are
impelled to give real content to the concept of qualified immunity for
high-level officials who must be neither deterred nor distracted from the
vigorous performance of their duties."' 50 One way to accomplish such
objectives is to require the trial courts to engage with the substantive
merits of the case at the pleading stage, but that, as we have said,
requires the trial court to engage at an early stage with the evidence. The
problem is substantive, having to do with the parameters of the litigation
actually before the court, and thus no formal, a priori test that ignores the
evidence can achieve the desired outcome. In what to us is the most
remarkable aspect of these cases, though, the Court was at pains to deny
it was requiring an engagement with the evidence at the very same time
that it was doing precisely that.' 5' It was at pains to deny it, we suspect,
both because that is not what courts supposedly do at the motion to
dismiss stage and because it would acknowledge the sliding scale aspect
of what the Court has actually done, leading to the concerns previously
noted about what it might mean for Rule 8 to be a rule. 5 2 Whatever the
motivation, it is the inconsistency between the Court's objectives (deal
with the substantive problems, but don't deal with evidence) that
generated the awkward standards that emerged from the opinions.
There is an additional cause of this awkwardness. The Court in
these cases is attempting to regulate the inferential process. That is
extraordinarily difficult to do for just the reason these cases make
evident-it requires constructing a priori rules that must anticipate
infinite variations on the evidence that might be produced, and that is an
impossible task.' 53 "Regulating inference" is a tough enough problem
when trying a case, where the parties pick and choose what issues to
present,154 and it is close to an impossible problem when writing a priori
inferential rules.
149. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
150. Id. at 559.
151. Id. at 554.
152. Id. at 584-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. Ronald J. Allen, Artificial Intelligence and the Evidentiary Process: The
Challenges ofFormalism and Computation, 9 ART. INTELL. & LAW 99 (2001).
154. The evidentiary regime accommodates this reality through liberal admission
rules and conditional relevance, that permits rulings on evidentiary matters to be delayed
until more evidence is received. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104. In addition, the parties are
largely ambiguity discarders rather than generators at trial. Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A.
Jehl, Burdens of Persuasion In Civil Cases: Algorithms v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST.
L. REv. 893 (2003).
32 [Vol. 115:1
CONLEY AS A SPECIAL CASE OF TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
To attempt to avoid the obvious implication that the Court's
approach will require substantive engagement with the evidence, the
Twombly and Iqbal opinions focused on three different variables. None
of them provides the slightest support for the proposition that motions to
dismiss are to be decided without reference to the evidence in the case.
First, the Court distinguished between assertions of sufficient factual
matters to show possible entitlement of a verdict on the one hand, and
"conclusory allegations," "legal conclusions," "bare," "threadbare" and
"naked" assertions,"' 5 5 and "formulaic recitation of the elements"' 5 6 on
the other. The analytical problem here is that there is no distinction
between "conclusory assertions" and anything else. Everything in a
pleading will be "conclusory," just as everything will involve the facts of
the case, as we demonstrated in the previous section. The difference
between the plaintiff listing the elements of a cause of action and
asserting the defendant violated them, and listing in exquisite detail what
the evidence supposedly will show is not a qualitative difference in the
"conclusory" nature of the pleading but a quantitative difference in the
level of specificity and the amount of detail. Rather obviously, when a
pleading asserts, for example, that "Defendant ran the red light," it is
"conclusory." It is summarizing and expressing in shortened form what
the pleader expects will happen at trial, to-wit that a witness will get on
the stand and so testify. But, that is also precisely the way in which a
pleading that asserts "negligence" is conclusory. The only variable is the
level of specificity. To some extent, the Court may have been suffering
here under the myth that there is a difference between questions of fact
and questions of law, but there is not.' 57 With that prop removed, this
edifice obviously falls. 58
We think this point is obvious, and will not belabor it. We simply
note that perhaps the best demonstration of its correctness is the Court's
own use of the spurious distinction. In Twombly the Court thought that
the allegation of a conspiracy was a "legal conclusion" and not,
apparently, a fact'59 but that is simply impossible to understand.
Asserting a conspiracy plainly asserts a state of affairs in the world
independent of the law, and this remains true even if the existence of a
conspiracy is an element of the substantive law. In any event, the
155. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1951, 1955 (2009).
156. Id. at 1955.
157. See Ronald J. Allen & Michael Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 1769, 1769-1807 (2008).
158. For an insightful analysis of the Court's curious reliance in the cases on the law-
fact distinction, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Law, Facts, and Power, 114 PENN STATIM 1
(2010), http://pennstatelawreview.org/ 14/114 Penn Statiml.pdf.
159. See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
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complaint went further and asserted agreements not to compete, among
other "facts."160 In Iqbal, a remarkable litany of what any rational person
would deem "facts" were found to be unacceptable conclusions, such as
Ashcroft being the "principal architect" of an invidiously discriminatory
policy, that Mueller "was instrumental in adopting and executing it," and
that this was done on account of the plaintiffs religion, race, and/or
national origin.' 6 1 These are factual assertions distinguishable in no
interesting qualitative way from an allegation like "the defendant ran the
red light" or that "the defendant drove negligently." One can require
greater or lesser evidentiary specificity in pleading, but one cannot
accurately capture the distinction with a rule about conclusory pleadings.
The static nature of such a rule obviously conflicts with the dynamic
nature of the phenomenon. This, of course, is precisely our point. One
can read Rule 8 to permit trial courts to insist on great specificity in
pleading when doing so advances the interests of the legal system; the
rule-like nature of the rule can be its direction about the effects of
regulation rather than a formal, a priori, test.
The second analytical tool that the Court employed to maintain the
pretense that it was not addressing the evidence was to distinguish
between evidence and "context."' 6 2 This distinction tries to mine the
myth that we elaborated in the previous section that there is a useful
analytical difference between "evidence" and the background knowledge
and experience brought to bear in appraising it. As we showed, there is
no such useful distinction. Evidence does not announce its own
implications; it can only be appraised from some perspective.163 To say,
as the Court did in both cases, that part of the problem was that no, or an
inadequate, "context" for the facts alleged was provided is simply to say
that not enough factual specificity was provided to satisfy the Court.
Consider again the case of negligence, and assume the plaintiff testifies
that the defendant's car ran the red light. Does that establish the fact or
fail to because of the plaintiffs obvious potential bias? Whatever one
thinks, is it because of the evidence or the "context"? Obviously, it is
both. One's prior beliefs are employed to make evidence meaningful,
and thus it is supremely unhelpful to make the distinction that the Court
did.
160. Id.
161. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. See also, Thornburg, supra note 158 (discussing the
extent to which inquiry undertaken by the Court in Iqbal conflicts with the traditional
deference shown by appellate courts for findings of fact made by lower courts).
162. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950, 1954, 1969.
163. See, Ronald J. Allen, On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout
Totals: A Clarification of the "Naked Statistical Evidence" Debate, the Meaning of
"Evidence," and the Requirement of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt, 65 TUL. L. REV.
1093 (1991).
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Consider Twombly in this regard. The Court's assertion that an
allegation of parallel conduct does not make "plausible" (we shall return
to that word immediately below) a conspiracy can be understood as a
statement about the implications of the evidence, standing alone as it
were, or as a statement about the set of beliefs that allows one rationally
to appraise it. One can say such an allegation is "insufficient" to justify
some inference, or one can say that the failure to contextualize it leads to
its insufficiency. One can say either because they are identical for the
purposes at hand. The Court's repeated efforts in these cases to suggest
that certain allegations were insufficiently contextualized is simply
equivalent to saying that they were insufficient, period. The invocation
of "context" adds literally nothing.
Now we get to the heart of the matter. The Court concluded that the
factual allegations were insufficient, which sounds like a factual
judgment about their probability, which it is, but again the Court denied
this.'6 According to the Court, pleadings are not to be tested by some
version of probabilism, but instead by whether their allegations set forth
a "plausible" basis for recovery. 16 5  Again, this is simply an
insupportable distinction.
"The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,'
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully," says the Iqbal court. 166 One immediately sees a problem:
"more than a sheer possibility" obviously means something more likely
than a very remote or logical possibility, but the language of "more
likely" creates precisely a "probability requirement." There has to be
something more probable than a "sheer possibility." Assume the
contrary. Suppose the probability of some proposition is 0.0. Could that
proposition, which is literally impossible, be nonetheless plausible?
Obviously not. The logical contradiction is evident and the conclusion
obvious that "plausibility" incorporates a "probability requirement."
To be sure, "plausibility" and "probability" are not coterminous,
and have a somewhat subtle relationship to each other. "Probability"
usually refers to some version of conventional probability theory where
propositions are arrayed on a number line ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. The
number can refer to a relative frequency, a propensity, a logical
probability, or a belief state under highly specified conditions.167 In such
cases, the numbers are computable and give rise to one of the powerful
164. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
165. Id. ("a well pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that
actual proof of those facts is improbable").
166. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
167. See, e.g., DONALD GILLIES, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF PROBABILITY (2000);
LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1954).
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tools of modem science. "Plausibility" by contrast is involved with a
different form of reasoning known as inference to the best explanation. 168
Inference to the best explanation arose as an alternative explanation
or tool of rationality which solves many of the serious problems with the
application of probability theory in many contexts.169 As its name
suggests, the central concept of inference to the best explanation involves
determining which of the possible explanations of events is "best," where
"best" means some complex mix of coherence, consistency, coverage,
consilience, efficiency and so on. The intellectual task involves
comparing and contrasting the various explanations to determine which
is best in terms of the various variables. The best explanation is certainly
likely to be the most probable, and here plausibility and probability meet,
but the driving force is not probability; instead, conclusions of the "most
probable" are governed by explanatory factors. In the law, inference to
the best explanation is a considerably better explanation of juridical
proof than probabilism.o70  The parties offer comparative accounts of
what happened, and the fact finders choose over them, or construct their
version of the best explanation in light of what the parties offer. The
rules of evidence facilitate this, as well.' 7'
Strikingly, except for the obviously erroneous assertion that
probabilism plays no part in plausibility, the Court applied the concept of
plausibility in a straight forward inference to the best explanation
fashion. Indeed, Twombly is a paradigmatic case of inference to the best
explanation. As the Court said, "here we have an obvious alternative
explanation"1 72 to the charge of conspiracy, which was parallel behavior.
The pleadings gave no reason to favor conspiracy nor sufficient ground
to believe that discovery would yield facts favoring conspiracy over
parallelism. 17 3 The plaintiffs' failing was in not providing facts directly
of a conspiracy, demonstrating that the context of this suit was one where
conspiracy was more likely than parallel conduct (note here the point
about there being no difference between "evidence" and its context
comes into play), or giving some reason to believe that discovery at an
acceptable cost would yield such information. 174 In short, the Court just
168. Ronald J. Allen & Michael Pardo, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27
J. L. & PHIL. 223, 223-43 (2008).
169. See generally PETER ACHINSTEIN, THE NATURE OF EXPLANATION (1985); PETER
LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION (2nd ed., 2004).
170. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 157, at 265-68.
171. Allen, supra note 135, at 630-640; Ronald J. Allen, Nature ofJuridical Proof 13
CARD. L. REV. 373, 413-420 (1991).
172. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007).
173. See id. at 557.
174. It is, of course, debatable as to whether the allegations of the Plaintiff in
Tivombly showed that conspiracy was or was not the more likely explanation for the
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wanted the plaintiffs to plead "more." Had the plaintiffs done so, one
could say that got them past the line separating "possibility from
plausibility" or that they had provided "enough factual matter ... to
suggest that an agreement was made,"175 but that simply means that the
added material changes the relative plausibility of the two propositions.
That in turn means the relative probability of the two propositions has
been adjusted as well, and that, quite contrary to what the Court said, the
Court imposed a "probability requirement" at the pleading stage. We
would say that, in fact, it refined it, as one has always existed. While the
"no set of facts" language of Conley has been read to preclude an inquiry
into probability, showing that "no set of facts exists" is the equivalent of
demonstrating that the probability of liability is exactly 0.0. Put another
way, to prevail on a motion to dismiss under Conley, the moving party
must prove a probability of non-liability of 1.0, which is exactly what it
would be if a plaintiff had failed to allege some essential element of a
claim or the law specifically barred relief on allegations in the complaint.
Iqbal does exactly the same thing as Twombly. Immediately after
reiterating that probabilism plays no role in pleadings, the Court launches
into an extensive and detailed discussion of the various explanations for
what happened and why intentional discrimination is not the most
plausible one.17 6  It sums up its conclusion that the pleadings "are
consistent with petitioners' purposefully designating detainees 'of high
interest' because of their race" but nonetheless inadequate by explaining
that "given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this
purpose."' 7 7 Rather obviously, one cannot at the same time rationally
dispense with a "probability requirement" to determine "plausibility" yet
conclude that something is not "plausible" because there are other "more
likely explanations." No sense can be given of "more likely" except
"more probable."178
Defendant's behavior, but this goes to the application of the Court's new standard in a
particular context, not the nature of the standard itself
175. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570.
176. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).
177. See id.
178. The Court did the same thing in Tellabs. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 321, 329 & 333 (2007). In construing the term "strong inference" in
Tellabs, eight of nine justices were in agreement that inferences could only be tested
against other inferences. Id. See also, supra note 76 and accompanying text. The Court
is correct about this, and has put its collective finger on a deep issue concerning the
nature of juridical proof. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of
Evidence, 88 Nw. L. REv. 604 (1994).
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VI. THE COMMENTATORS AND RULES
The pleading cases have generated an enormous body of scholarly
commentary from very erudite scholars of civil procedure.17 9 They have
analyzed the cases from multiple interesting perspectives, but each of
them responds to the cases with a more or less static rule that largely
recapitulates the awkwardness of the Court's discussion of the meaning
of FRCP 8."s0 We give a few examples from a set of articles remarkable
(to us at any rate) for their insight that nonetheless operate from the
unspoken assumption that a rule must be static.
Prof. Bone, writing before Iqbal was decided, argues that Twombly
"requires no more than that the allegations describe a state of affairs that
differs significantly from a baseline of normality and supports a
probability of wrongdoing greater than the background probability for
situations of the same general type."' 8 ' The Twombly complaint was
deficient because the "correct baseline is competitive behavior under the
particular conditions of the telecommunications market, and there is
nothing necessarily odd about what the defendants are doing."l 82
Moreover, "By a 'baseline,' I mean the normal state of affairs for the
situations of the same general type as those described in the complaint.
The probability of wrongdoing for baseline conduct is not necessarily
zero, but it should be small for otherwise the conduct in question would
not be part of a socially acceptable baseline."' 83
Prof. Bone's analysis is piercing and extremely clarifying, but his
understanding of the case substitutes one static rule for another. First,
identifying the baseline as innocent conduct appears completely
arbitrary.18 4 The case before the court will be a member of innumerable
reference classes,'85 some of which will composed of largely innocent
members but some of which will not. For example, why not use the set
of litigated cases as the baseline, for which presumably the probability of
liability would be much higher and which seems more likely to be
predictive of the substance of the case? But, if the baseline is higher and
one needs significant departure from it, the pleading standards become
179. See generally supra note I and cited articles.
180. See supra note 6 and cited articles.
181. Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 1, at 878.
182. Id. at 858.
183. Id. at 885.
184. As Adam Smith wrote in 1776, "[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet
together ... but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public." ADAM SMITH,
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 152 (1776). While a presumption of innocence or non-liability
may make sense when allocating burdens of proof, few would seriously contend that this
is done to represent the objective likelihood of a particular party's guilt of innocence.
185. See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Value of Mathematical Models of
Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 109 (2007).
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more difficult as the probability of liability goes up, which seems
peculiar. Using a baseline of cases where the plaintiff ultimately
prevailed on the merits would be similarly problematic because this
would effectively immunize well concealed conspiracies from suit.
Second, merely requiring that "allegations that differ in some significant
way from what usually occurs and differ in a way that supports a higher
probability of wrongdoing than is ordinarily associated with baseline
conduct" leads to widely varying results, which is a good marker of a
static rule in a dynamic environment. 86 If, for example, the probability
of wrongdoing in the "baseline" is .01, but the probability of wrongdoing
given the allegations is .1, there has been a tenfold increase in the
probability of wrongdoing, but it still remains extraordinarily low. If a .1
probability is nonetheless adequate to proceed, why is it not adequate if
the baseline probability is .11 and the allegations suggest a .1
probability? What difference does the direction of the movement make?
When Prof. Bone then applies this understanding to Erickson, it
appears he has to make adjustments to it. He asserts the baseline is "that
plaintiffs would receive treatment for serious illness," but the non-
culpable baseline would seem to be that prisoners would receive the
treatment that they need and not be substantially harmed by the choices
of prison officials.' 87  In Erickson, remember, the complaint failed to
allege that the plaintiff would be harmed as a result of the actions of
prison officials, and thus the pleadings do not describe a state of affairs
inconsistent with the proper baseline. Thus, Erickson is not consistent
with this understanding. Alternatively, by adjusting the baseline, which
itself is not constructed by reference to very confining a priori rules, any
result at all could be justified.
Prof. Bone then turns to his own suggestions for what should be
done, and the analysis is again piercing and insightful, and is a
fascinating exploration of the normative issues that might arise.' 88 Still,
he ends up suggesting another static rule-in particular that the concern
of pleadings should be the identification of meritless suits, however that
186. Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 1, at 878.
187. Id. at 886 n.68.
188. Id. He does struggle with what "fairness" might mean in some context, such as
having difficulty explaining what is wrong about "forcing a defendant to shoulder the
burden of litigation without giving the defendant any reason why he should." Id. at 900.
We think this is quite simple to explain. Rights are completely reciprocal. The defendant
has the same right not to be harmed by the plaintiff as the plaintiff has not to be harmed
by the defendant. Imposing costs to defend meritless suits is a harm. The probability of
that harm goes up as the reasons justifying plaintiffs actions go down. Thinking of
things probabilistically solves this problem. It is also an example of how many of the
problems in this general area are driven by the failure of the parties to bear the true cost
of their behavior.
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is defined, in light of the complex normative analysis he provides.1 89
Focusing on meritless suits has all the advantages and disadvantages of a
static rule, and recapitulates the problems that the Court might have been
struggling with on our understanding of what it did. Screening more or
fewer meritless suits can have any effect at all on the full range of social
values to be optimized. It could encourage too much or too little of
otherwise useful behavior. Iqbal, decided after Prof. Bone wrote his
article, may be a clearer case of this than Twombly, where allowing suits
by disaffected people against high governmental officials could bring
governmental processes to a halt.
As discussed above, understanding Rule 8 dynamically eliminates
these artificialities. The parties can assert what they want, what
baselines (reference classes) are appropriate, suggest why social interests
are or are not optimized by permitting the case to proceed, and the judge
can decide who has the more plausible case.
Prof. Spencer has provided another informative analysis that, like
Prof. Bone, emphasizes the relationship between morality and utility
optimization.190 Again, though, his conclusion as to what is now
demanded of pleading reduces to a static, and thus awkward, rule. He
summarizes his conclusion that "it appears that legal claims that apply
liability to factual scenarios that otherwise do not bespeak wrongdoing
will be those that tend to require greater factual substantiation. . . ."191
However, if "allegations of objective facts present a scenario that, if true,
is neutral with respect to wrongdoing by the defendant [the pleading] ...
fails to state a claim," and "the addition of speculative suppositions to
suggest wrongdoing will not overcome" the presumption of propriety.192
Prof. Spencer's rule, like Prof. Bone's, is static in the sense that we
mean it, and not surprisingly has some of the same difficulties as a result,
such as the problem of the reference class. A priori, any set of
allegations will be within numerous references classes, some of which
may be neutral with respect to the probability of liability and some of
which may not be. Prof. Spencer tends to focus on a very general
reference class of all the activity encompassed within the set of
allegations, but no good reason is given to focus on that class. It would
seem to make more sense from both a moral and a utility maximization
perspective to focus on the set of litigated cases, or the set of cases in
189. Id. at 898. He also argues that whatever is done should be done by rule makers
rather than through a common law process. Id. To reiterate, we do not address the
process issues.
190. A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1,
26(2009).
191. Id. at 14.
192. Id. at 16.
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which there were similar pleadings. There are, after all, disincentives to
plaintiffs to bring suits, and those disincentives plausibly weed out weak
cases. As we explained above, however, this approach brings with it its
own set of problems.
Other somewhat surprising consequences obtain as well. Prof.
Spencer requires that allegations not be "neutral," but that appears to
mean that it is more likely than not that there is liability.193 That imposes
at the pleading stage the standard of persuasion of the typical trial. How
that can be done efficiently pre-discovery is unclear. What can be done,
as we described above, is make contingent decisions to proceed to the
next stage of litigation.
Last, the distinction between "objective facts" and "speculative
suppositions" seems to capture the distinction between direct and
circumstantial evidence. The distinction between these two is more
difficult to identify than is commonly believed.19 4 The old distinction
(direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, establishes a material
proposition) was designed to sort out the more from the less reliable, but
it has become clear that it is not a terribly effective rule. Eyewitness
testimony is typically direct evidence and DNA typically is
circumstantial evidence, but in many cases the DNA evidence is much
more probative than the eyewitness. Prof. Spencer gives the example of
a pleading of racial discrimination and suggests that there is a difference
between pleading that a person was fired after being told "you are too
black" and one that simply alleged racial discrimination.195 Both seem to
us to assert "objective facts," the only difference being the inferential
process that each instantiates. The inferential chain may be longer in the
latter case, but as the DNA example shows, that does not mean it is less
reliable. There is not, in short, the direct relationship between this
distinction and plausibility necessary for this rule to work well.
Regardless, the critical question is whether there is a difference in these
pleadings that makes a difference from the perspective of the optimal
construction of the legal system. It is hard to see what that might be.
Both are perfect examples of Conley type cases where costs are low and
information symmetrically distributed.
In his 2007 paper, Richard Epstein meticulously unpacks the
economic implications of Twombly and writes what is essentially a
compelling brief on the merits for dismissal at the pleading stage.196
When he generalizes, though, he moves from the dynamics of economic
193. Id. at 14.
194. RONALD J. ALLEN, RICHARD B. KUHNS, ELEANOR SWIFT & DAVID S. SCHWARTZ,
EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 124-26 (4th ed. 2006).
195. Spencer, supra note 190, at 18.
196. R. Epstein, supra note 6, at 62-72.
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analysis to the traditional static language of (some) rules: "[t]here are
two kinds of error in all cases, and so long as the plaintiff relies solely on
public evidence that is refuted or explained away by the same type of
evidence .. . then the balance of error has clearly shifted... . [This]
should lead to a dismissal at the close of pleadings in any case where the
defendant has negated all inferences of culpability by using the same
kinds of public evidence that the plaintiff has used to establish a factual
underpinning to the underlying complaint." 9 7  However well this
explains Twombly, it is immediately apparent that its explanatory value is
constrained. Cases may rely on "public knowledge" but not necessarily
involve a huge cost imposition on defendants. The a priori probability
of liability may be higher than in antitrust cases (which Prof. Epstein
assumes is quite low'9 8), and thus the likelihood of an erroneous finding
against a defendant low as well. The distinction between public and
private knowledge is not immediately apparent, as a party may exercise a
great deal of control over what becomes public about his activities.
Iqbal, which came down after the initial drafts of Prof. Epstein's article,
is a perfect example of the type of situation where a powerful defendant
had a great deal of control over the information available about his
activities and in which the need to control this information itself became
an argument for dismissal. Conversely, as was likely the case in Conley,
private knowledge obtained through discovery may be relatively cheap
and quite dispositive, and so on. Rather than this awkward static rule,
the questions to ask are the ones that animate his critique and
justification of Twombly, which are the ones we discussed above.
We know of no exception to the assumption of the commentators on
Iqbal/Twombly that rules are static. 199 As we pointed out earlier, many
197. Id. at 98.
198. Id. at 99 (arguing that in an efficient market, antitrust conspiracies should
"collapse of their own weight").
199. The most recent example of yet another very interesting discussion of the
pleading problem that again operates on the implicit assumption that rules are static is
Steinman, supra note I at 1314-1325, 1334-35, in which an incisive analysis is followed
with a static rule. Pardo makes this point effectively:
According to Professor Steinman, the "conventional wisdom" that Bell Atlantic
and Iqbal impose a plausibility requirement is wrong as a descriptive matter-
he contends that the problem with the complaints was that they were
"conclusory," and that "plausibility" may be a way to save a conclusory
complaint but not a way to dismiss a non-conclusory complaint. For example,
he argues that the complaint in Bell Atlantic alleged conduct consistent with an
agreement but did not "take the next logical step" and allege that the defendants
"agreed to undertake that conduct." Likewise, in Iqbal-although the
complaint alleged that (1) Ashcroft and Mueller approved of the policy to
subject the plaintiff to alleged the [sic] detention conditions because of religion
and national origin, (2) Ashcroft was the "principal architect" of the policy, and
(3) Mueller was "instrumental" in implementing it-Steinman contends the
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legal rules are dynamic rather than static, although to our knowledge this
is never the terms used to discuss them. Hopefully one contribution of
this article will be to make clear the power of the distinction generally,
and how the distinction in turn highlights critical aspects of the pleading
problem.
VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK
As the foregoing makes clear, scrutiny of the pleadings is no longer
just a question of fair notice-and almost certainly never was. 200 Each of
the Court's avoidance mechanisms-conclusory assertions, context, and
plausibility-simply reinforces that the Court was involved in a relative
plausibility inquiry that was informed by the benefits and costs of correct
decisions and errors. Although "plausibility" and "probability" are not
synonymous, neither are they hermitically sealed off from one another.
Moreover, to engage in any form of comparison of the relative
plausibility of inferences will require engagement with the evidence
agreement was a "distinct" event and the complaint failed because it did not
allege anything about "the content of this agreement." The failure of both
complaints was that they described the "goals or future consequences" of
agreements without "indentifying the content[s]" of the agreements themselves.
Steinman's reading of these cases is provocative and an important challenge
to the "conventional interpretation" of the pleading cases, but it does not stand
up to close scrutiny. This is so because the idea of "conclusory" allegations
cannot support the weight it is being asked to bear. Steinman proposes defining
"conclusory" in "transactional" terms: "an action is conclusory when it fails to
identify the real-world acts or events that entitle the plaintiff to relief." But
anyone reading either complaint would know to what real-world events the
plaintiffs are referring: an agreement not to compete, etc. in Bell Atlantic and a
policy to discriminate in Iqbal. It is not clear how merely saying "agreement"
(as opposed to "conspiracy") in the complaint in Bell Atlantic would make it
any less conclusory. Nor is it clear how saying, shortly after September 11,
2001 Ashcroft and Mueller approved a policy with the content "subject
Pakastani Muslims to maximum security conditions because of their religion
and national origin" is any less conclusory than saying that one designed and
the other implemented a policy with these effect for these reasons. Moreover, a
number of satisfactory examples of complaints are similarly "conclusory" and
would fail this test. The complaint in Swierkiwicz, for example, does indeed
describe "real-world acts or events"-i.e. "the plaintiffs firing." But like
Iqbal, this is simply the "future consequence" of a prior action (the decision to
fire plaintiff because of age), and the complaint does not describe the content of
that decision. And, as in Iqbal and Bell Atlantic, the reason for the future
action is what matters for purposes of the substantive law. Similarly, Form 11
describes the defendant's negligent driving but does allege what this defendant
did that was negligent.
Pardo, supra note 17, at 39-41 (footnotes omitted).
200. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007) (wherein the Court
subjects the language of Conley to extensive criticism); Spencer supra, note 6 at 431; see
also Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REv.
IN BRIEF 135, 140 (2007), www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf.
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related to those inferences. Everything, in short, that the Court was
denying that it was doing, it did in Twombly; in Iqbal it unequivocally
ordered the trial courts to do it as well. Justice Stevens' suggestion that
the Court is engaging in an evidentiary inquiry when evaluating
pleadings is true to the extent it recognizes that the court is considering
the strength of the inferences within a complaint.201 What is a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of wrong doing?
And what does a plaintiff have to allege to establish such an expectation
given the costs and risks of error involved?
Some think answering the kinds of questions should be the task of
rule makers rather than common law courts.202 The concern is that the
domain of such decisions is too wide, requires too much knowledge, and
as a result individual judicial decisions will be idiosyncratic and
unpredictable.20 3 That may be correct, but as we have argued it neglects,
first, the power of the generative common law process, itself an example
of dynamic rule making, and, second (and more importantly), the
comparative nature of litigation generally. On the assumption that the
federal courts have been pointed down such paths, we can identify a
number of principles that could guide the journey, although we will leave
it to others to decide if it is the optimal solution for the legal system.
First, allegations which simply restate the elements of a claim as
required by the substantive law and allegations of specific conduct are
not fundamentally distinct; they are simply allegations which are made
with differing degrees of generality. This is why the distinction between
facts and conclusions has historically been difficult to maintain and why
it would be a mistake to read Iqbal as inviting a return to a fact pleading
204
regime. A second and related point is that conclusory allegations
generally are plausible to some degree. The question is not whether a
conclusion is plausible, but whether it is sufficiently plausible. This, in
turn, can only be determined by comparing the competing inferences
proposed by the opposing party.
Third, requiring additional factual specificity beyond mere
recitation of the formal elements of claim is likely to reduce a
defendant's proportional share of discovery costs, as the plaintiff will
have been required to expend more effort to research his allegations
201. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579.
202. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need For Procedure
Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REv. 319, (2008) (discussion relationship between underlying legal
norms and contours of procedure).
203. See id. at 323 (discussion relationship between underlying legal norms and
contours of procedure). See also Bone, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 1, at 851.
204. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (rejecting notion that
Twombly announced anything other than a new pleading standard).
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before filing his claim. 20 5  This tends to discourage claims brought
against defendants in the hope of compelling a settlement. And vice
versa, of course. In some cases, such as the res ipsa cases, perhaps even
the Conley standard imposes too high of a hurdle for plaintiffs.
Fourth, the basic framework for sorting actionable conduct from
inactionable conduct is the substantive law and those presumptions used
to allocate evidentiary burdens between plaintiff and defendant at trial.206
By requiring the plaintiff to plead what he must prove at trial, the
plaintiff is required to show that he or she is entitled to relief, but this is
facilitated by allowing the plaintiff to take advantage of those legal
devices which would allocate the risk of error due to incomplete
information, so that he is not placed in a position where he must plead
207more than he would have to prove.
Fifth, the plausibility of a complaint can only be evaluated by
examining the inferential connections between the legal elements and the
more specific factual allegations that have been made to instantiate those
elements. In some cases, this may require considering whether one set of
conclusory allegations is supported by a second set of conclusory
allegations which are themselves supported by specific factual
allegations-like in Iqbal where a plaintiff would have to negate an
affirmative defense at trial.208 Whether particular allegations support his
entitlement to relief depends on whether the defendant can offer a more
plausible theory to account for them.
Sixth, the level of particularized allegations can vary from case to
case based on the degree to which a party is likely to bear a
disproportionate share of the costs during the discovery phase, the
probability and costs of errors, the degree to which a plaintiff could be
expected to offer more particularized facts without the aid of discovery,
and the a priori likelihood of liability. 20 9  The ultimate question
205. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1996).
206. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1946-47 ("whether a particular complaint sufficiently
alleges a clearly established violation of law cannot be decided in isolation from the facts
pleaded. In that sense the sufficiency of respondent's pleadings is both inextricably
intertwined with and directly implicated by the qualified immunity defense.") (citations
omitted). While this statement could be read as applying to the limited area of civil rights
complaints, we think that the principle articulated is much broader. "[The] basic thrust of
the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation. . . . If
a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties ... it is counterproductive to
require substantial diversion . .. in litigation. . . ." See id. at 1953.
207. See generally Pardo, supra note 17. This is central to Pardo's reconciliation of
the procedural and evidentiary regimes.
208. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948 (2009).
209. See FED.R.Civ.P. 9. Rule 9's provisions for alleging states of mind in fraud
cases can be seen as endorsing just such an exhaustion exemption. Since the cost of
providing a plausible inference regarding a defendant's state of mind by way of
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remaining is whether the plaintiff provided sufficient matter in the
complaint, taken as true, to justify the potential costs of going forward.
Seventh, in making these determinations, the courts have no choice
but to rely on the relationship between what the parties present and their
own experience with similar matters and the experience of other courts
with similar situations, and how those apply to the case at hand, but that
is to say that the courts will have to consider the evidence. They will
have to make judgments about the relative balance of availability of
information and costs, and a priori probabilities that one side or the other
deserves to win. As we have said, here is where objections to this
development will focus.
The proposals set forth above carry forward the two "operating
principles" the Court identified in Twombly and the hierarchy of
pleadings set forth in Iqbal.21 0 To be sure, the testing of the inferences
that can be drawn from allegations in a complaint is a fundamentally
different inquiry than the one a court would pursue if it were only
seeking to determine whether a complaint gave fair notice to a defendant
of the charges against him. However, it is not fundamentally different
from the numerous other types of gatekeeping inquiries in which courts
already engage.2 11
The most important aspects of the explanation we offer is that it
recognizes, first, the relationship between static and dynamic rules and
contexts, and second, the relationships between evidence, procedure, and
substantive law. These relationships are intrinsic to the way the Court
has analyzed complaints in the trilogy of pleading cases which explore
the plausibility standard. Our explanation merely makes explicit these
relationships and their implications.
Twombly and Iqbal may represent important changes in the way
complaints are evaluated at the pleadings stage. However, they need not
be viewed as a rejection of trans-substantive approaches to pleadings or
an improper intrusion of "evidentiary" concerns into "procedural"
inquiry, and they may be an important first step toward developing a
more rational and coherent pleading process. There are potential
difficulties, of course. In one sense, predictability regarding pleadings
may be lessened, but as we have pointed out, predictability in pleading
particularized allegations would put a heavy burden on the plaintiff, it is reasonable to
allow the plaintiffs in a typical case to allege this point generally, and then place the
defendant in the position of rebutting it.
210. Further, they unpack the understanding of inferences outlined in Tellabs. See,
supra note 76 and accompanying text.
211. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326 (2007)
(discussing instances of 'judicial gatekeeping' such as expert testimony decisions,
summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law).
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may carry with it perverse substantive results. We leave it to others to
balance all these matters. Our effort here has simply been to understand
them.
We close with one last point. Our analysis may appear to be
radically unstabilizing of the orderliness of rules. In addition to
difficulties about the extension of terms and the relationship between
different variables that presently plague the process of applying rules, we
now overlay another question about the conceptual foundation of a
rule-is any particular rule to be understood as dynamic or static? Can
the apparent implications of a rule be avoided merely by claiming that
what was thought to be a static rule is dynamic or vice versa?
These are serious questions and we have two responses to them.
First, most rules are clear on their face as to their nature, as in the famous
example of "keep off the grass," 2 12 and the equally famous, and opposite
from this perspective, examples of do not act negligently and be
reasonable. Second, and much more importantly, perhaps rules are often
not clear precisely because of the failure to consider the difference
between static and dynamic rules and conditions, and a traditional static
approach is taken to what calls for a dynamic one. Rule 8 may be an
example. From the face of it alone, one cannot say which it is. The
Conley gloss is one way to understand the phrase "entitled to relief' in
Federal Rule 8. However, Rule 8 may also be understood as requiring
that a pleading must show that the objectives of the legal system will not
be subverted by continuing the lawsuit. Perhaps this reflects the fact that
its drafters were under the influence of the then and now prevalent notion
of a rule, but were such sophisticated observers of the legal system that
they knew, at least intuitively, of its evolutionary character and the
difficulty of capturing the evolving future in a presently articulated set of
necessary and sufficient conditions which could be reduced to a specific
verbal formula. Whatever the drafters were thinking, or the present
members of the Supreme Court, hopefully we have at least shown that
the distinctions between static and dynamic rules and between evidence
and context, as well as the complex relationships between evidence,
procedure, and substantive law, are jurisprudentially deep and interesting
matters that bear attending to. If they are attended to, perhaps the result
will lead to more rather than less stable results.
212. Gerald Graff, "Keep off the Grass," "Drop Dead," and other Indeterminacies:
A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEXAs L. REv. 405 (1982).
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